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IV. ABSTRACT
The last twenty years have characterized the difficult relationship India and 
Pakistan have shared since Independence. It is almost impossible to separate 
Kashmir from this relationship. This period from 1987 to the present has 
influenced and affected impacted the region then every before, insurgency, 
violence, terrorism, human rights abuses, economic stagnation, war and global 
events like the collapse of the Soviet Union and 9/11 have all had an effect in 
South Asia. While briefly covering history, geo-politics and past rhetoric till 1987, 
this thesis focuses on the major events that have occurred in Kashmir in the last 
twenty years and the underlying Indian and Pakistani strategies, which have 
influenced these events. Consequently the thesis analyses the implications of 
these events today, and what they portend as we move towards the future. It also 
pays due attention to changes in the world order, that have affected Kashmir: the 
significance of the NATO led War on terror, in the light of the rise of Islamic 
fundamentalism cannot be overstated, and the constant changes in the dynamics 
of the US -  India- Pakistan relationship.
The last few years may have seen a reduction in the insurgency, along with 
overtures made by both countries - CBM's and official peace talks, however a 
solution has remained elusive. Looking forward, this thesis explains why and how 
events in the last twenty years, will lead to a solution in the future. It also debates 
the possibility and time line of a conceivable solution, rooted in a settlement along 
the LOC (something that India seems to want albeit not yet officially and what 
Pakistan may agree to). It also analyses the paths towards the future, both 
countries will have to take to end the violence. Conclusions are drawn from the 
analyses in order to understand the implications the past will have on the future.
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V. LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
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VI. KASHMIR TODAY1
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1 Not to Scale Map outlining the present positions in Kashmir, courtesy the CIA and the Library of 
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1. A TROUBLED LAND
1.1 Introduction
-v "in / ¿¿UJ _ j ! - t  " t . J  ¡ jjM J  j ! - ‘ "■ .■/(Jtuu
/Agar firdaus bar roo-e zameen ast,
Hameen ast-o hameen ast-o hameen ast 
If there is a paradise on earth 
this is it, this is it, this is it2
The dispute over Kashmir has characterized the relationship or rather bitter 
rivalry and mutual distrust that India & Pakistan have shared, from the time they 
were parted in 1947. Kashmir goes a long way beyond a simple dispute over a 
piece of land .Strategically, it is the ancient barrier, the beginning of the Karakorum 
Himalayas that separated the rest of the subcontinent from central Asia. 
Ideologically, it gains more importance, Kashmir, with its Muslim population, is a 
representation of the founding pillar of Pakistan -  Islam as a religion and a 
precursor for statehood. Kashmir has different manifestations in India, religion 
being one of them, albeit in a different way, the only state with a Muslim majority in 
a behemoth secular nation. Today as India aspires for global prominence as a 
future superpower and Pakistan struggles for existence, Kashmir, is slowly 
acquiring other dimensions for both nations.
Close to six decades, after the partition of the subcontinent, Kashmir 
continues to stir a hornet's nest in India and Pakistan. In the words of former UN 
Secretary General Kofi Annan “In South Asia the world has recently come closer 
than for many years past to a direct conflict between two countries with nuclear
2 Persian Poet Amir Khusrau's on what Mughal Emperor Jehangir, once said when was in 
Kashmir. Exact text can be found at the Amir Khustrau Foudation, (http://www.alif- 
india.com/index.html) Website accessed on March 23, 2007
8 I H R I S H A B H  S A N D I L Y A I E P S  2 0 0 5 - 2 0 0 7
K A S H M I R  T H E  L A S T  T W E N T Y  Y E A R S  : M O V I N G  T O W A R D S  T H E  F U T U R E
capability”3 he noted than ever before. Kashmir's roots predate the current 
conflict, if one delves deeper, it is obvious that the within a pre-partition India, 
Kashmir did not have the global prominence it rather notoriously enjoys today,. It 
is in the British of policy of decolonization and nation building in which the roots of 
the current conflict lie. Hindustan was to be split into two states, it was necessary 
for the British to keep one under their influence for a vast number of reasons. On 
one hand, India was too large and disagreeable; on the other hand Pakistan with 
it’s over dependence on British administration, troops and supplies, was looked at 
as an independent territory that would be beholden to the Crown for years to 
come. So the decision was made and the British chose to make Pakistan4 happy 
over the initial part of the Kashmir dispute. The world was in turmoil at the half­
way mark through the 20th century, and it would be unfair to lay the blame entirely 
on the politics of Churchill, Atlee and Noel-Baker.
1.2 An Outline of Events
The obvious was stated and the obvious happened, the UN was brought in. 
The US was involved much against their will, Kashmir and the Israel-Palestine 
conflict, were perhaps the biggest problems brought to the UN, in the 1940's in a 
world still fraught with disbelief at the destruction World War II had caused, and a 
world not deeply divided by a Cold War. Perhaps, had the international 
community acted then and forced a solution when both countries' foreign policies 
were still taking shape, it would have stayed binding. The Security Council 
Commission for Kashmir, offered hope of a solution, but its recommendations 
weren't implemented. It is hard to blame India and Pakistan for that, there was too 
much mutual distrust floating in the air. This centred on a withdrawal of troops, a 
plebiscite and a solution perhaps more theoretical than practical.
3 Kofi Annan's address to the UN General Assembly on 12 September 2002, full text available at 
(http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2002/SGSM8378.doc.htm) Website accessed on March 13, 
2007
4 C Dasgupta, War and Diplomacy in Kashmir 1947-1948 (New Delhi : Sage, 2002) Page 15
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Then the inevitable happened, there was war followed by a long period of 
uneasy peace and then stalemate, sixteen years, and no solution in sight. 
Pakistani troops, were now officially guarding the then called Cease Fire Line or 
CFL. The world was well entrenched in the throes of another war, this time a Cold 
War. Pakistan out to win the favour of the West joined the Baghdad Pact and 
signed up its allegiance to the US, a defence pact with the UK had preceded this 
move. India, in its wish to remain Non Aligned, was one of the founders of the 
Non Aligned Movement, with plenty of back seat support thrown in by the Soviets, 
whose vetoes to keep India a happy had kept Kashmir firmly out of the Security 
Council's purview5. Tired of the inaction, Pakistan emboldened by its motional 
land gains in small border skirmishes in the Rann of Kutch, decided to up the ante, 
militarily in Kashmir. A winner less war was fought, and the countries were back at 
square one, aided by the Tashkent declaration, which was signed in a spirit of 
peace and understanding.
Fast forward to the 70’s and the 80’s the dispute for Bangladesh or East 
Pakistan eventually had little bearing on Kashmir, with India emerging as a clear 
winner. The Shimla Accord that followed had the laid down the groundwork for a 
solution, the LOC had been declared as the de facto border, and seventeen years 
on, there was no solution in sight. Importantly the Shimla Accord distanced both 
India and Pakistan from the UN demand for a plebiscite, something that Pakistan 
was soon going to go back on its word about. India and Pakistan had both been 
through different stages of political turmoil with the Emergency in India and a long 
spell of military rule in Pakistan. Kashmir itself was under a fairly misleading long- 
last lull in activity -  Sheikh Abdullah had been released from jail, and the National 
Conference NC, had grown accustomed to the fact that Kashmir was an integral 
part of India. A few years on, his son Farooq came into power, riding the fame of 
this father’s legacy that he would soon fail to live up to6.
5 Josef Korbel, The Kashmir Dispute Continues (Far Eastern Survey : Volume 3, Number 26, 
March 1957)
6 Tapan Bose, Kashmir, A Willing Suspension of Reason, Himal Southasian Magazine (Kathmandu 
: May 1999)
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It was in the early and mid-eighties the seeds for the insurgency were sown 
amongst Kashmiris in the valley. Long neglected by their politicians and disgusted 
with the Center for its meddling, the valley became a hotbed for communal activity 
and there were frequent clashes between Muslims and Kashmiri Pundits. The 
1987 elections in the state were alleged to have been rigged by Farooq Abdullah 
and by the Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi7 which led to a surprise victory for the NC, 
since an alliance of opposition parties called the Muslim United Front had been 
predicted to win. The period between 1987-1989, turned out to be the last straw in 
the patience of the average Kashmiri who had tended to support India in the past. 
The disappointment set in and a large number of Pakistani supported secessionist 
outfits took undue advantage of this.. They used Kashmiri hospitality as a base to 
launch an insurgency campaign that has terrorised the state since. Enjoying tacit 
Pakistani support, these secessionists were represented politically by a number of 
often clashing outfits, and militarily by mujahedeen, (often ISI backed) 
mercenaries.
The Kargil War in 1999 brought Kashmir back into the limelight, especially 
after both countries had gone nuclear, the previous year. The world was weary; 
this was the first full war that two nuclear neighbours had ever fought. In the end, 
it took skilful diplomacy on part of the US, to help influence the decision. The 
Kargil War, so far had been the most senseless of skirmishes, the Pakistani Army, 
aimed to resuscitate the dying secessionist movements, and aided armed 
intruders in their ambition to capture close to 400 square kilometres8 of vital Indian 
territory, apart from eliciting a rapid and aggressive Indian response, the w ar 
served no purpose, other than drawing the world's attention to a blatant Pakistani 
attempt to cross the border. The Kargil war also served as a watershed in the 
domestic policies of Pakistan, with General Musharraf, staging a coup and
7 Rajat Ganguly, India, Pakistan and the Kashmir Dispute (Asian Studies Institute & Centre for 
Strategic Studies : July 1999)
8 Shaukhat Qadir, An Analysis of the Kargil Conflict (Royal United Services Institute for Defence 
and Security Studies Journal: April 2002)
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claiming power from a weakened and shamed Nawaz Sharif. This move, too, 
would have its repercussions on the India - Pakistan relationship.
Towards the end of the Clinton regime in the United States, and up to the 
middle of 2001, India's international strategy seemed stronger. It had , on its side, 
world opinion against a military dictator and his support of terrorism9. In May 
2001, US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage hinted Pakistan was a 
rogue state10 and that Pakistan had little to offer. This period seemed to have 
showcased India's future potential in the eyes of the US, and the support the US 
was willing to lend to find a solution. However the 11th of September 2001, 
changed all of that. The World Trade Centre bombings, ensured that Pakistan 
became a necessary ally in the War on terror, it also changed its value in the eyes 
of the US. This thesis analyses the changes that occurred post 2001, and the 
impact they have had in Kashmir.
The last few of years of relative inaction and the realisation within the All 
Party Hurriyat Conference APHC, that dialogue is the way forward, has given 
renewed hope to the peace process. Whilst the grim repercussions of the past, 
continue to overshadow today's Kashmir, the current situation is not without hope. 
The 2004 Agra Summit, laid the grounds for a number of Confidence Building 
Measures and Track Two Diplomacy, The May 2006, US -  India Nuclear deal was 
the final stamp on the shift of emphasis in US policy towards India along with its 
continued condemnation of Pakistan's support for cross border activities. The 
thesis reviews the implications the past two decades have had, on the prospects 
of a future solution. While the idea of presenting a solution, would seem 
appropriate, it is perhaps better to focus attention on the groundwork needed and 
the pathway to the future, for a host of reasons.
9 Yishane Lee, A Coup in Pakistan,(Asiaweek : October 13, 1999)
10 Amin Saika - Pakistan Ruler Has Little to Offer India (International Herald Tribune : June 21, 
2001)
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1.3 Proposed Analysis
The main question this thesis asks is suggested within the title itself. 
Kashmir as a topic has been largely written about, with a number of scholars, 
lending perspective to an issue, that has the captured the imagination of more 
than a billion people for over half a century. It is my belief that, by looking at the 
events in the last two decades, and analysing them in the right perspective, it is 
possible to use the path these events have taken, and help predict a future. This 
thesis does exactly that; it outlines the issues that led to the build-up of the events 
in the last twenty years, analyses these events against the backdrop of the 
strategic policies of both India and Pakistan. The thesis then tries to shed light on 
the way forward, using the past as a precursor to the future.
1.4 International Mediation
One school of thought has constantly advocated, international mediation, 
then again international mediation hasn't always worked, especially in Asia, where 
ideological beliefs have outshone the need to make peace and listen to reason. It 
is suitable here to draw comparison to the LTTE, and the struggle for a Tamil 
heartland within Sri Lanka, as I am writing this, there is genuine concern of Sri 
Lanka, being in the throes of Civil War11, after successive attempts at peace, 
brokered by the Norwegians largely and the EU. However given the stakes 
involved, and Pakistan's public abhorrence to a 'No First Strike Policy' ensure that 
the international community will have a role to play. The US has used diplomatic 
pressure, and intervened successfully since the 90's often at times when the 
countries have been on the brink of war. While India has rejected the possibility 
of International intervention, a lot of its policy towards Kashmir, has been reliant on 
the pressure the international community has been willing to exercise on Pakistan 
especially in relation to cross border terrorism. What this thesis will explore further
11 Matthew Rosenberg, Sri Lanka Seen Heading Back to Civil War (Associated Press : May 5 207) 
International Herald Tribune Website accessed on March 21 2007
(http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/05/06/asia/AS-FEA-GEN-Sri-Lanka-At-War-Again.php)
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is how the US which seems to have a definite role in the past two decades and the 
international community, can help influence the formation of a solution.
1.5 A Solution Perhaps
It is obvious that any permanent solution will require both India and 
Pakistan “to take the long view’*2, sometimes complex problems have simple 
solutions. However it is not always a simple issue of moving beyond past rhetoric, 
for too long, both India and Pakistan have let past events dictate the present 
course of strategy they have employed in Kashmir, however there seems to be 
hope, in the last few years. Politicians on both sides, have acknowledged this, 
and have agreed to move on. In a speech to the nation, President Musharraf 
himself said ‘7\s the president o f Pakistan, I want to convey a message .... If we 
want to normalize relations between Pakistan and India and bring harmony to the 
region, the Kashmir dispute will have to be resolved peacefully through a dialogue 
on the basis o f the aspirations of the Kashmiri people ."13 The current Indian PM 
Manmohan Singh, seems to have gotten things correct in this regard -  with 
endorsement from Pakistani politicians14 and Kashmiris, who believe that he 
seems to have the right intentions. One can question why after sixty years we 
may find a solution, when it has proved so elusive before, the answer lies in 
Kashmir itself, the people need it to survive.
It is obvious any framework of peace, however possible, will have to keep 
all the stakeholders happy and work to satisfy the most reasonable demands that 
each has. There will be no victor in the dispute over Kashmir, no one country can 
claim it. This thesis sheds light on the outline of one possible solution and more
12 International Crisis Group Report - Kashmir, Learning from The Past (New York : ICG, April 
2001)
13 President Musharrafs address to the Nation -  11 January 2002, full text available with the 
Government of Pakistan, excerpt taken from the Peoples Daily Website
(http://english.people.com.cn/200201/13/eng20020113_88547.shtml)
4 Interview with the former Prime Minister of Azad Kashmir, Sardar Qayum -  Zee News, April 28 
2007 (http://www.zeenews.com/znnew/articles.asp?aid=368333&sid=SAS)
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importantly the steps that will need to be taken to arrive at that solution. Sharing 
Kashmir on the basis of maps is impossible. The people and the powers to be 
have to be willing to endorse first, the changes that will allow a solution. Mindsets 
will have to be changed, ideologies re-interpreted in order to free Kashmir from its 
status as a hostage of the contending nationalisms of India and Pakistan so that 
we can arrive at a long lasting peace.
1.6 The People of Kashmir and Self -  Determination a Possibility?
One must spare a thought too, for the people of Kashmir, for too long they 
have suffered, their paradise on earth, now echoing the wail of a valley. They 
crave an end to the mindless violence, the military occupation, the removal of the 
mercenaries, and the return to normalcy. Resisting choosing between the frying 
pan and the fire, many Kashmiris, thought they had a valid argument for an 
independent state. It is therefore safe to assume that any solution to the current 
crisis will have to factor in the Kashmiris need for their own identity and the right to 
govern themselves, at least in some part. Many different solutions have 
incorporated this, each with a varying amount of autonomy for the region15. 
However it is a general perception amongst most scholars and thinkers that the 
complete independence as an option, is one that will not pass muster. It is 
obvious that given the landlocked nature of any future Kashmir state, its economy 
and lifelines will be heavily dependent on its neighbours. Similarly given the 
precarious nature of the region, the physical security of Kashmir will have to 
guaranteed by its stakeholders -  a chance perhaps to be influenced by a variety 
of imperialisms. This is also a view increasingly concurred by politicians within the 
region who recognise the fallibility of the situation16
15 For a simple understanding of different solutions that have been proposed and their respective 
viabilities see the BBC News Special Report on the Kashmir Flashpoint. Website Accessed April 
30, 2007 (http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/in_depth/south_asia/2002/ kashmir_flashpoint/default.stm)
16 Kashmir Leader Rejects Independence, World Peace Herald, 1 May 2007. Website accessed 
on 12 May 2007 (http://wpherald.com/articles/4571/1/Kashmir-leader-rejects-independence/A- 
need-to-be-realistic.html)
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However the degree of autonomy that Kashmir will receive within a solution, 
will have to be shaped by various considerations: the wishes of the people being 
the first -  therefore it is necessary that every type and voice of opinion be heard, 
and used to shape the contours of the autonomy that it will receive and therefore it 
should take “secularism and Kashmiriyat as a ‘‘basic structure", with no side 
excluded ... Since democracy is the proposed answer, such an answer must 
necessarily be democratically arrived at. “ 17
17 Badri Raina, Is Independence a Viable Option for Jammu & Kashmir? (Znet Mag : January 2007 
http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?ltemlD=11953) Website accessed April 23, 2007
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2. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE PERIOD UP TO 1987
2.1 History, Geography and Society
The contemporary history of Kashmir can be traced back to the 1846 
Anglo-Sikh War, which effectively ended the dominance of the Sikhs, and after 
which the British sold the former Sikh enclave of Jammu & Kashmir to a Rajput 
Dogra Clan lead by Gulab Singh for the princely sum of 750,00018 pounds and the 
acknowledgment of British supremacy over Kashmir. The region we know as 
Jammu & Kashmir was thus established as a princely state bordering China to the 
north and the east, bordering what is now Himachal Pradesh and Punjab in India, 
and the current North West Frontier Provinces in Pakistan. Further more the Gilgit 
region shares a part of its border with Afghanistan. The princely state was centred 
on the populated and beautiful valley region, with Srinagar as its capital. The 
other populated regions of the state, included the Jammu region in the south with 
Jammu city as its capital, lying in the foothills of the Himalayas, peppered with 
temperate forests and plains, and the, high altitude Ladakh region to the north and 
the east, with Kargil and Leh as its major towns.
Geographically, Kashmir is diverse, a vast region in the temperate and frigid 
zones. Kashmir is made up of plains, hills and forests in the south and towards 
the north, the mighty Karakorum Himalayas (K2, the second highest mountain in 
the world), arid flatlands, stunning landscapes and valleys, and above all, lakes 
and rivers. It is here where a part of the dispute arises from. Kashmir holds the 
source to all five of the Indus River's tributaries; Jhelum, Beas, Ravi, Sutlej and 
Chenab the deltas of these rivers and the Indus valley basin, are the fertile 
heartlands of Pakistan's agriculture. While the source of the Indus, lies in Tibet -  
the Mansarovar lake, Jinnah understood his geography when he called Kashmir, 
Pakistan's jugular vein. Moving eastwards, we find the arid dry lands of the 
Ladakh region, which borders the now Chinese Aksai Chin region and the
18 Alastair Lamb, Kashmir, A Disputed Legacy 1846 -  1990 (Hertfordshire : Roxford, 1991) Page 8
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Pakistani part of the Northern Territories, where lie the Siachen glacier and the 
high passes of Bilafond and Sia to Gasherbrun at the top of the snow-peaked 
Saltoro Mountains This region has always proved a natural barrier to any invading 
force, and the Indian army has ensured that this strategic area remains guarded. 
In fact the Kargil War, was fought on the Srinagar -  Leh Highway, the only supply 
route to Ladakh. Geographically Kashmir is a barrier itself as it has the endless 
mountains which are the massive natural fortress that protects the rest of India. It 
is entirely for this geographic reason that the value of Kashmir, can never be 
underestimated for any of its stakeholders.
Socially, Kashmir has been a melting pot, a rather mini version of India. It 
is a vast mix of religions, cultures and ethnicities. Its people are differentiated 
from each other, vastly due to the contrasting geography and the influences that 
filtered in from different parts. The residents of the Kashmir valley who number 
close to 5 million are predominantly Muslim, the people in Jammu the other half of 
the state are two-thirds Hindu and a third Muslim. Towards Ladakh and the east, 
the sprinkling of population is Buddhist, with pockets of Muslim areas19. Language 
wise the people in the valley speak Kashmiri; in Jammu, Pahadi and Punjabi are 
spoken in a majority of the regions. In Ladakh's Buddhist areas, the language 
tends to resemble Tibetan. The map below provides for a better understanding of 
the religious breakup of the population of the entire state which is two-thirds 
Muslim and one-third Hindu, Buddhist and Sikh.
The population of the princely state of Kashmir was hardly any different 
from that of today. The 1901 census showed that even then Muslims constituted 
a majority of the population. Analyzing population statistics in Annexe V, in 1941, 
out of a population of 7 million in Kashmir, Muslims constituted 77 per cent, 
Hindus 20 per cent and Sikhs and Buddhists the remaining 3 percent. Region 
wise, Muslims constituted 93 per cent of population of he valley, 61 per cent of
19 All demographical data, has been obtained from Govt, of India Census and the Kashmir Study 
Group (http://thekashmirstudygroup.net) see Annex V
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Jammu and over 90 percent of the population in the Poonch and Gilgit areas. 
Partition brought about large changes in Jammu, which acquired a Hindu majority 
after movement across the borders20. The 1981 census reflects a change, with 
Muslims being 64 per cent and Hindus 32 per cent of the population. However the 
insurgency in the 90's would see over 200,000 Hindu Kashmiri Pundits fleeing the 
valley region, changing forever the population dynamics of the region. The 
population demographics of Kashmir, tell the tale of the complex social and 
religious structures of the people. In fact the structure of Kashmiri society could 
be best described as that of a 'matryoshka doll'21.
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Economically the state had always been largely agrarian, with the feudal 
system controlling land ownership. Additionally, it seemed it was the rich Rajputs 
and Hindus from Jammu, who enjoyed a majority of the land and the wealth. The 
Muslims though in the majority had little. They were poor and hardly helped by an 
indifferent ruler. Even within the valley, Kashmiri Pundits enjoyed a majority of the
20 Rajat Ganguly - India, Pakistan and the Kashmir Insurgency: Causes, Dynamics and Prospects 
for Resolution. Asian Studies Review, Sep2001, Vol. 25 Issue 3
21 Sumantra Bose, Kashmir, Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace (London : Harvard, 2003)
Religion based map courtesy the Kashmir Study Group (http://www.thekashmirstudygroup.net)
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clout, especially as officials within the government of Hari Singh, disproportionate 
to their r representation in the population. Muslims on the other hand were largely 
uneducated, they were simply not given opportunities they deserved. In contrast 
to the Kashmiri pundits, Muslims were not allowed to even become officers in the 
state army, These positions were reserved exclusively for the Hindu upper castes. 
Independence and accession to India, did little to change things, although now the 
Muslims had a voice and some semblance of control of their own lives, they were 
still not afforded opportunities. Outside the valley, the situations were worse, forty 
years of being part of India till 1987, did little for the Kashmiris economically, 
perhaps an adequate setting for rebellion against economic inefficiency “A general 
premise is accepted in ethnic conflict literature that poverty, combined with ancient 
hatreds or power imbalances between different ethnic and religious groups, may 
very well be a factor exacerbating ethno-religious violence. ”22
Today with close to an estimated toll of 30000 to 50000 deaths23, it is 
difficult to imagine the effect, the conflict has had on life in Kashmir. Economically 
this eighteen year period of insurgency has stagnated the growth of this state to 
one of the lowest, in what is now one of the fastest growing economies in the 
world24. A similar story echoes, in Azad Kashmir, the population of the entire 
region of Kashmir has quadrupled since 1948, however the consequent growth in 
GDP, has been less than half25.This is not surprising, considering that the 
economy was largely agrarian or dependent on the cottage industry and handicraft 
sectors which were hit badly by loss of life and the problems of militancy. 
Kashmiris, are obviously tired of the violence, and the prospects of a bleak 
economic future, if it continues.
22 James, Carolyn C. and Ozdamar, O zgur, 'Religion as a Factor in Ethnic Conflict: Kashmir and 
Indian Foreign Policy', (Terrorism and Political Violence : 17:3, 447 - 467)
23 The Indian government officially estimates 30,000 deaths since 1989. Kashmiris, including the 
All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC), estimate between 80,000 to 100,000 deaths, primarily 
civilian. Most observers estimate the total to be more than 60,000 deaths, again mostly civilian. 
See Learning from the Past: International Study Group Asia Report, 2003
24 India's economy grew at 9% for the year 2006, second only to China amongst major nations, 
data available from the Ministry of Finance, GOI
25 Shahid Jawed Burki, Kashmir - A Problem in Search of a Solution (United States Institute of 
Peace : Washington DC, 2007)
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2.2 Conflict and its Reasons
In order to understand why the conflict developed, it is necessary to 
understand the geo-political changes and pressures that surrounded the formation 
of Kashmir in the light of the partition of India, and the role of British strategic 
Interests in the area. Kashmir was the largest of the 562 princely states that made 
up half the the British Empire in India. In 1947, the British announced their 
decision to withdraw from India, however they also wished to leave India in two 
halves. The rulers of the princely states, were left free to choose between India 
and Pakistan. Technically though, they could choose to stay independent, as the 
Doctrine of Paramountcy26, would lapse. By the time Independence occurred, 
Kashmir was one of the major states, which had not decided to accede to either 
dominion, much against Viceroy Mountbatten's wishes. The problem was simple, 
Kashmir was contiguous to both India and Pakistan, the regent Hari Singh, had no 
illusions of living without power, and chose to stay independent. Pakistan and 
India both claimed Kashmir, the Muslim Conference in Kashmir leaders preferred 
aligning with Jinnah and Pakistan. The National Conference, the dominant voice 
of the valley and Sheikh Abdullah its leader, preferred a secular, democratic yet 
independent Kashmir, with close ties to India.
The choices were simple but the British simply did not want to make a 
decision27. To deny a Muslim majority state in Kashmir to Pakistan, would simply 
go against the ideology behind the formation of Pakistan -  a separate state for 
Muslims, and create an angry Jinnah, which Britain did not want. Similarly India, 
lay claims to being a secular state, how could it be , without even one state with a 
Muslim majority. This became a necessity in the eyes of Nehru and Gandhi, who 
had a mammoth struggle in front of them. For hundreds of years, Kashmir had 
been an integral part of the country, now its future lay in the hands of a regent,
26 Alistair Lamb, The Genesis of the Kashmir Dispute 1947-1948 (Hertfordshire : Roxford, 1997) 
Pages 93-100
27 Alistair Lamb, The Genesis of the Kashmir Dispute 1947-1948 (Hertfordshire : Roxford, 1997) 
Pages 35-41
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who had no aspirations, beyond his own.
Hari Singh's rule had its enemies, and in a need to find respite from his 
autocratic and repressive regime was the seed for the first Kashmiri War planted.. 
Hari Singh, connivingly signed a standstill agreement with Pakistan28, just before 
Independence in order to buy time. However the effects of communal violence 
and sectarian actions across the subcontinent, were soon felt, in Kashmir itself. 
Disgruntled youth, from the valley regions near Pakistan, using this as an 
opportunity, colluded with some Pathan tribes from the NWFP, and invaded 
Kashmir, from the north west, in October 1947, in what they saw as a battle of 
liberation from the Hindu rulers rule. Alarmed by the pace at which the invaders 
had made massive inroads in the state, and his own armed forces inadequacies, 
Hari Singh looked towards India for protection.
Jawaharlal Nehru, was happy to oblige. A previously belligerent Maharajah 
was begging for support, however Nehru and later Mountbatten insisted that 
Kashmir accede to India, before Indian armed forces could step in for her defence, 
in order to provide legality for the move. Hari Singh, had no choice, and with the 
blessings of Sheikh Abdullah who was soon to be established as Prime Minister of 
Kashmir, the Instrument of Accession was signed on the 27th of October 1947, 
Indian troops were airlifted to Srinagar and by early November had offset most of 
the gains the invaders had made. Nehru, and other members of the Cabinet, 
were also keen on a full fledged offensive through the winter that would have 
made precise incisions into Pakistani territory. It was a move that later, Lord 
Mountbatten would scuttle as Chairman of Defence Council of India and 
Pakistan29.
What was apparent was that the invaders would not have made it to within
28
Kashmir-Pak Standstill Agreement. Telegram from Prime Minister, Kashmir State, to Sardar 
Abdur Rob Nishtor, States Relations Department, Karachi 12th August, 1947
29 General Eric Vaz, Truly an Extraordinary Fellow (R ediff: May 27, 2004) Website accessed on
20 March 2007 (http://www.rediff.com/news/2004/may/27spec1.htm)
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15 miles of Srinagar, had it not been for Pakistani support. In fact infuriated by the 
Indian intervention in October, Jinnah as Governor-General of Pakistan, had 
ordered Field Marshall Auchinleck, to dispatch Pakistani troops into Kashmir, a 
move that he later rescinded, because Auchinleck convinced Jinnah, that 
Pakistan's limited forces, were hardly an even match for India's. Later on, in early 
January 1948, Jinnah sent in troops in the guise of tribesmen, as support for the 
invaders perched dangerously across the border. It was at this stage, that the 
story took its all too well-known twist towards the UN.
Convinced by Lord Mountbatten, that India's respite in the matter lay in the 
hands of the UN, (Mountbatten sincerely believed that a solution could be found at 
the UN) However this would serve another British purpose, to be able to 
manipulate the Security Council30. Nehru, officially placed the matter in front of 
the Security Council on January 1, claiming that Pakistan had invaded India, 
invoking Article 34 & 35 of the UN Charter. Along with its official complaint, India 
also reiterated its pledge for a legal plebiscite / referendum once the invading 
forces had been purged. It is here at the UN, that a complete understanding of the 
global strategic forces, surrounding India, Pakistan and Kashmir and the impact 
they had on the further UN Resolution is possible.
“In 1947, when Pakistani tribesmen invaded Kashmir, Britain decided to 
adopt a pro-Pakistan tilt —  not because o f any merit in the case but strictly in 
pursuit o f British global interests in the belief that this was essential for her Middle 
Eastern policy. Unfortunately for India, the British minister in charge o f executing 
this policy Philip J Noel Baker, had few scruples in exceeding his instructions.” 31 
It is essential to understand why British foreign policy at that stage had its pro- 
Pakistan tilt. The reasons were there for all to see. Quoting a telegram from the 
British Foreign Office addressed to the Prime Minister in 1948 "The Foreign 
Secretary has expressed anxiety lest we should appear to be siding with India in
30  —Prem Nath Bazaz, Kashmir in Crucible (New Delhi : Pamposh Publications, 1967)
31 C Dasgupta, War and Diplomacy in Kashmir 1947-1948 (New Delhi : Sage, 2002) Pages 25 - 30
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the dispute... over Kashmir... With the situation as critical as it is in Palestine, 
(Foreign Secretary) Mr. Bevin feels that we must be very careful to guard against 
the danger o f aligning the whole of Islam against us, which might be the case 
were Pakistan to obtain a false impression o f our attitude in the Security Council."
It was obvious to the British, that its interests in the Middle East were 
dependent on its policy on the newly formed Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Under 
severe criticism for its role in the formation of the Israel -  Palestine conflict, Egypt 
and Iraq, Britain was under fire. It saw Pakistan as its saviour in that sense, a 
chance to mend its ties with a lot of the Islamic world, given its need and reliance 
on oil, and its recovery from a decade filled with war. It also saw Pakistan as an 
important part of its defence ring. Previously, India had always been an important 
stop on the map as it commanded the Indian and Pacific oceans. Now with the 
attention shifting westwards towards the Gulf States and oil interests, Pakistan 
was its obvious interest given its proximity to that region.
Additionally in the period after Independence, the defence forces of both 
India and Pakistan were dependent on British officers, who were to oversee a two- 
three year period of transition. However this dependence was less for India as it 
had the bigger army, far more defence weaponry and a large number of Indian 
officers. All this meant that India would not be completely dependent on British 
forces in the event of war. This was vital as the British Cabinet, had passed an 
order for all British officers to stand down, in the event of any possible fighting 
between India and Pakistan. On the other hand, Pakistan was largely dependent 
on British officers, for strategy and as leaders in any possible skirmish. It was 
obvious to Britain, that she could exercise far greater influence on Pakistan, 
through her army, than over India. From this point, it is obvious that by forcing 
India to take the matter to the UN, Britain was serving her own interest, and it 
restrained India, by locking it into a UN process, that Britain could control, rather
32 C Dasgupta, War and Diplomacy in Kashmir 1947-1948 (New Delhi : Sage, 2002) Pages 25 - 30
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than letting India solve the situation militarily, in its own favour.
The Security Council worked towards a resolution, dominated by the British 
representative,. The Americans it seems understood the legal validity of the 
Indian claim, but chose to go along with the British, as they did not seem to have 
much of a policy towards Kashmir33. In August, after the members of the United 
Nations Commission on India and Pakistan (UNCIP) returned, the Security 
Council resolution was passed. Significantly, it called for a complete withdrawal of 
Pakistani and Indian troops and tribesmen, an immediate Cease-fire and the need 
for a plebiscite under UN administered conditions. The implications of the UN 
Resolution were felt far more in the years following this , than at the time itself. A 
cease-fire went into effect on the 1st of January 1949.More than a third of the state 
remained under effective Pakistani control now called Azad Kashmir, and a Line of 
Actual Control (LOAC) was drawn up demarcating the actual positions of both sets 
of troops.
An analysis of the events of 1949, tell us that they continued to influence 
rhetoric on both sides of the border for years to come. The UN resolution failed, 
India refused to go along with the proposed demilitarization in 1950, and a 
stalemate was reached. The UN passed a further resolution and in 1953, a 
plebiscite seemed imminent with Nehru promising one, however procrastination in 
Pakistan and the army influence, ensure that the stalemate continued34. It is at 
this stage, when Pakistan and India began to find themselves at the opposite end 
of the Cold War divide, and Western influence began to seep in. In 1954, Pakistan 
became part of the pro-US Baghdad and two years later it followed this move by 
joining the South East Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO), it is here at this stage, 
the military balances began to shift. As a recipient of US bilateral aid, Pakistan 
began to buy American military equipment, enabling it at this stage to close the 
gap between its forces and India's. Nehru saw these moves as inimical to India's
33 Dr Subash Kapila, United States’ Obsession With the Kashmir Issue: An Analysis (SAAG : No 
403, January 2002)
34 Vernon Hewitt, Towards the Future (Cambridge : Portland Books, 2001) Pages 59 - 60
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interests, and decided that a plebiscite in Kashmir would no longer be valid. 
Meanwhile, after the death of Stalin in 1953, Soviet policy had begun to change as 
it delved into the Cold War35, The Soviet Union saw India as a rising Asian nation, 
one that had stood up to Imperialism, it also saw it as a counter to the US and 
China's presence in the region. It is here that the Soviet veto was acquired by 
India, and its multiple uses in the Security Council when Kashmir would be 
brought up in the future.
2.3 Kashmir -  The Middle Years
Internally Kashmir state politics were a mess, in the period from 1947 to 
1953 when Sheikh Abdullah was in power. He ran the government of Kashmir as 
his personal fiefdom till 1953. He chose members of the inaugural constituent 
assembly, and made little room for anyone opposed to his National Conference 
(NC). Abdullah was Nehru's man, he had his deal with Nehru, in return for his 
support for India he was given a free reign. It was in this period that the Indian 
Constitution came into being and along with it the ominous Article 370, with its 
reference to the special status that the state of Jammu and Kashmir was 
accorded. Apart from uniting the people in 1947, against the autocratic Maharaja 
and the seminal Land Reform Act, that followed, which eliminated the feudal 
system of land ownership, Abdullah soon returned to autocratic and dictatorial 
ways of the previous king.
An analyst wrote “Time has now come to pass judgement on Abdullah's 
Government. Internally, it was hardly democratic. Opposition was suppressed, 
and civil liberties existed in name and for those who shared his views. His 
economic views were radical but he combined them with the working o f the like- 
minded totalitarian Governments elsewhere. He enjoyed tremendous popularity,
35 Robert Donaldson, Soviet Policy Towards India : Ideology and Strategy (Cambridge, Mass : 
Harvard University Press, 1974)
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yet resorted to questionable means to gain an electoral majority”36 By 1953, after 
the Delhi Agreement, and successfully managing to keep the centre at bay, with its 
intentions of bringing Kashmir under the purview of the Supreme Court, Abdullah 
became confrontational with his attitude towards Delhi and issue of autonomy for 
Kashmir. A little coup within the NC, ensured that he was deposed with help from 
Delhi, and the speaker of his handpicked constituent assembly replaced him. 
Abdullah then spent the next 22 years in jail, enjoying brief periods of freedom in 
between.
It is in between this period from 1953 onwards that the seeds for the crisis, 
that has plagued the last twenty years, were sown. Sheikh Abdullah's successor 
as Prime Minister of Kashmir was GM Sadiq, a puppet in the hands of New Delhi. 
Sadiq kept Nehru and his successors happy, in return for his position he towed 
India's line, and dropped the demand for self-determination. However the 
Kashmiris were unhappy with the rampant corruption and lack of development. 
The anger against Delhi's meddling transferred itself into action, in the 1963 riots 
over the Hazratbal Shrine, sacred to the Sunni Muslims, as a relic of Prophet 
Mohammed himself. The fragmented National Conference was a shadow of its 
former self, the witch-hunt it created against any sort of opposition, fully aided by 
the centre did not even fulfil the procedural minima o f democratic governance37. A 
functioning opposition is essential for any democracy, the blatant criminalization of 
the political opposition from Mirza Beg's pro- Abdullah Plebiscite Front to the right 
wing Hindu nationalist parties the Praja Socialist Party and Jan Sangh, no legal 
opposition was given a voice or any chance to provide legitimacy to the 
government, just with its presence. The Kashmiri's were unhappy, and although 
there was no sense of unrest, disappointment was in the air.
It was at this stage when Pakistan decided to formulate 'Operation 
Gibraltar1, led by the incumbent military dictator General Yahya Khan, it decided to
Jyoti Bhushan Das Gupta, Jammu and Kashmir (The Hague: Martinus Nijoff, 1968) Page 209
37 Sumantra Bose, Kashmir, Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace (London : Harvard, 2003)
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take advantage, of a few things seemingly in Pakistan's favour38, as Pakistan grew 
extremely weary of India's attempts to postpone settlement. The 1962, Sino -  
Indian War, was a decisive victory for Chinese forces, and this emboldened the 
Pakistanis to believe that for once, militarily they could force a solution, especially 
after they had tasted success in a few skirmishes in the Rann of Kutch. Of the 
firm opinion, that the Kashmiri peoples disappointment, would flare up, Pakistan 
sent in guerrilla fighters across the border, aided and covered by Pakistani troops. 
When this proved to be a failure, and after the Indian army crossed the LOC in 
Jammu, a quick full fledged war was fought in the state of Punjab in Pakistan. UN 
and International calls for a cease-fire were quickly responded to , as both sides 
seemed to have realised the futility of conflict.
2.4 The Road to Perdition
The period that followed the 1965 War, is largely acknowledged as the 
period that laid the grounds for the insurgency. If the middle years, had fomented 
the discontent, this period, was responsible for the failure of all the institutions in 
place to assuage discontent. The first five years till the 1971 Bangladesh 
Liberation War, were largely quiet. The war was fought with Kashmir on the 
periphery, what followed was a resounding victory for the Indians, and a general 
trend of thought, within some of Kashmir's educated Muslims and political 
commentators, that maybe Pakistan itself was not the answer, especially if it could 
not keep itself together, if religion was the basis of its formation. “Indian Political 
commentators questioned Pakistan's claim on the Muslims o f Kashmir when it 
could not keep its two wings together on the basis o f religious faith”39. On the 
whole the Kashmiris had seemingly remained faithful to the Indian cause.
While the common man, seemed unaffected by the Shimla Declaration
38 Brigadier Shaukhat Qadir, Operation Gibraltar (Rediff : Sep 8 2005) Website accessed on 18 
March 2007 (http://www.rediff.com/news/2005/sep/08war1.htm)
39 Sumit Ganguly, Explaining the Kashmir Insurgency: Political Mobilization and Institutional Decay 
(International Security, Vol. 21, No. 2. (Autumn, 1996), pp. 76-107)
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signed after the war in 1972, it was at this point, when internal manipulations of 
Kashmiri politics gave way to two phenomena -  one was the larger pan-India 
phenomenon of political decay -  more specifically the destabilisation of political 
institutions which protected democracy in order to ensure survival40, and the 
empowerment of the common man on various fronts. Elaborating on these 
various fronts, politically, Kashmiris who had been now living with democracy over 
the years, had began to appreciate in some sense its virtues/but had also in this 
process had realised their rights. Socially, Kashmiris felt the need to have their 
own society, represented by themselves, not controlled by Delhi, let’s not forget 
here that the concept of Kashmiri statehood or an identity, is not age-old, but a 
rather recent ideology that rose from 1846, before that Kashmir was a part of 
various sub continental kingdoms, with different identities. An identity was being 
formed, an identity that wanted to be recognised, for itself.
There were various reasons for the empowerment of the Kashmiris. 
Though the state was poor, education was provided for all, and by the 70's a lot 
more Kashmiris had education, a trend that was to continue for the next few 
decades. With education and literacy -  came awareness and the ability to want 
something more from their surroundings. Additionally, the media had spread its 
wings. Radio and television, the democratic make-up of the state, also allowed for 
the spread of contrasting opinions and a unique Kashmiri identity, which had not 
been possible before, with an uneducated populace. While some Indian 
institutions seemed to be functioning effectively, the accompanying political 
institutions and check-points in place, were failing miserably41. This led to a 
spread of the discontent, a situation that India had largely brought on herself,
while she thought she was doing her best to protect her interests. In 1975,
Sheikh Abdullah was released from house arrest, after sustained pressure and 
campaigning by the Plebiscite Front led by his deputy Mirza Beg. It represented in 
some sense, a triumph for democracy and acknowledgement of the wishes of the
40 Particular reference is being made to the period through the 70's when Indira Gandhi, subverted 
Parliament, on many occasions and eventually declared an Emergency.
41 Meredith Weiss, The Jammu and Kashmir Conflict (Yale : 25 June 2002)
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Kashmiri people, but it was soon to be another bit of political fallacy. Abdullah 
contested the elections in 1977 on a campaign for change in Delhi's attitude, he 
won comfortably and was made Chief Minister, and would stay in that chair till he 
died in 1982.
His son Farooq took over the mantle, and in his zeal to prove himself an 
effective leader, he spurned Indira Gandhi's hand, and the even though the NC 
won the elections in 1983 comfortably, a year later she dismissed him, on the 
flimsiest of grounds, and replaced him with his brother in law GM Shah, a move 
that would have many repercussions in the state for years to come. It was a move 
that marked the beginning of the end of any belief Kashmir had in Indian political 
institutions. While Farooq Abdullah was certainly a novice, Shah was seen as a 
puppet in the hands of Delhi, much like GM Sadiq, decades before, his reign was 
pockmarked by political unrest and demonstrations. Keeping with the trend, the 
new Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, dismissed him as well, claiming he was corrupt,. 
The circus continued, Farooq Abdullah was reinstalled on the chair, after he had 
reached an agreement with Gandhi -  a move that lost him the entire legacy he 
had earned as Sheikh Abdullah's son. If not a stooge in the hands of Delhi, he 
was seen as a 'sell-out' - “The accord reduced him to the stature o f a mere 
stalking horse for the Congress Party in Kashmir”.42
If 1984's political chicanery had been the turning point, 1987 was the final 
nail in the coffin, for political institutions. The 1987 elections in Kashmir, 
symbolised the rot and decay in the Indian political system. The Congress and the 
NC, fought the elections together -  what this meant, was that Farooq Abdullah 
used his powers in Srinagar and Rajiv Gandhi his in Delhi, to ensure perhaps the 
most rigged election in the history of India. Perhaps in 1987, had elections been 
fair, the insurgency would not have had the effect it did. Protest against these 
elections were the stepping stone to fame for key insurgency leaders like Shabir
42 Sumit Ganguly, Explaining the Kashmir Insurgency: Political Mobilization and Institutional Decay 
(International Security, Vol. 21, No. 2. (Autumn, 1996), pp. 76-107)
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Shah, Yasin Malik and Jawed Mir, all representatives of the Muslim United Front 
(MUF) that should have won a majority instead of the five seats that it did,, that 
would later go on to form various other insurgency groups. While it is not possible 
to attribute the entire insurgency to the failed 1987 elections, it certainly did 
provide the first spark for the fire. A majority of Kashmiri youth had given a secular 
and fair democracy a chance, conniving politicians refused to -  the end result was 
violence, something that we see even today.
“In transforming the socio-economic landscape o f Kashmir and producing a 
generation o f politically aware Kashmiris, while also leaving the growth o f political 
institutions in Kashmir stunted and corroded, the national and state-level 
governments left open few institutional channels for the expression o f political 
discontent and dissent. Moreover, the national government construed demands 
for political autonomy as incipient secessionist moves. This set o f policies 
inevitably drove the emergent generations o f Kashmiris toward more extreme 
forms o f political expression. As secular and institutional pathways o f expressing 
political dissent were curbed, political mobilization and activism increasingly 
proceeded along an ethno-religious dimension. ”43
43 Sumit Ganguly, Explaining the Kashmir Insurgency: Political Mobilization and Institutional Decay 
(International Security, Vol. 21, No. 2. (Autumn, 1996), pp. 76-107)
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3. THE LAST DECADE OF THE 20TH CENTURY
3.1 The Global Makeup of Kashmir at the End of the 80's
Four decades of cold war were coming to an end, for Mikhail Gorbachev 
with his pet policies of Perestroika and Glasnost, the role the Soviet Union would 
play in the world, and consequently Asia, was to be redefined. In 1989, the Soviet 
Union moved out of Afghanistan, after years of global criticism of its role in the 
land. It left behind a trail of destruction, and a puppet government led by the 
communist Najibullah. With a weakened government and no mandate, in the 
south and the east, of Afghanistan, anarchy was strife within the regions. 
Thousands of armed Mujahedeen, crowded the border areas with Pakistan, with 
little to do as, they had already served the purpose of their American and Pakistani 
masters, ensuring that the Soviet Union did not extend into South Asia. The US, 
would have little more use for these warriors. As far as it was concerned, it had 
done its job, in the region. In establishment of a quasi democratic government in 
Afghanistan, and its emergence as the single superpower in the world, it had 
proved its mettle in Asia
Pakistan on the other hand, had achieved its purpose too. By keeping 
Soviet forces out, it had managed to circumvent a possible Indo -Afghan- Soviet 
allegiance44, which could have tilted the balance of power within the subcontinent. 
Additionally it could continue commanding influence in the war-torn land: a 
necessity .given the strong rebel movements in its border areas with Afghanistan 
especially in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) where a number of 
Pashtun tribes, had on different occasions, declared their inclination to be re­
united with the Pashtuns in Afghanistan. Thus “the Afghan war allowed the 
Pakistan military to re-assert itself as the dominant force in Pakistan’s politics, 
economy, and society Any influence it had lost after the 1965 and 1971 wars was
44 Brigadier Feroz Hassan Khan, Rough Neighbours: Afghanistan and Pakistan (Strategic Insights, 
Volume II, Issue 1 January 2003)
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regained. Consequently, during this period the military consolidated its control 
over Pakistan’s foreign policy and many o f its bureaucracies.”45 It was also at this 
stage that the powers to be within Pakistan, arrived at the realisation that the time 
to settle on Kashmir would arrive soon, and that after 17 years of being on the 
disadvantaged side of the Shimla Accord, it believed that if it could support the 
cause of Kashmiri self-determination on its territory and rally the international 
community against India, it would be in a position to obtain a favourable 
settlement, as India with its aspirations for global prominence and the need to 
move into the 21st century would no longer be in a commanding position to dictate 
a settlement.
Kashmir itself, at this point was becoming increasing vulnerable to the 
Islamic influences in the region, all over. The seeds had been sown in Iran with 
the Islamic revolution, and only exacerbated with the rise of Gulbuddin Hemkatyar 
and his fundamental Sunni group, that was working on usurping power in 
Afghanistan. All in all Kashmir, was in the middle of a rising arc o f Islamic 
fundamentalism46 which would soon rise to envelope the region, forever changing 
the struggle from one of self-determination to one of fundamental and religious 
beliefs for the general populace of Kashmir. It was a combination of these factors 
that would form a supporting environment for the struggle in the next decade. It 
was at this stage that the ISI, with its experiences in Afghanistan and as the sole 
guarantor of National security within Pakistan, used the ripe situation in Kashmir, 
to put into action the well thought out plans the Army wished to embark upon.
In contrast India at the end of the Eighties was moving forward slowly. 
Forty years after Independence, it was shedding flab and about to embark on a 
restructuring of its economy and its perception of itself, as looking towards the 21st 
century, it aspired to be a global power, the credentials of which would be
45 Captain Matthew Taylor, Pakistan’s Kashmir Policy And Strategy Since 1947 (Monterrey : Naval 
Postgraduate School, March 2004)
46 Here reference is being made to the rise of the Taliban and other theocratic Islamic 
organisations and the rapid increase in fundamentalism that would characterise Islam at the end of 
the 90's to the present.’
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questioned, if it could not deal with events in its own backyard. The end of the 
Cold War, also brought about fundamental shifts in India's foreign policy47. 
Russia, the successor to the Soviet Union could continue arming India but no 
longer guarantee India's security any longer, especially against a colluding China 
and Pakistan. It also opened India's eyes to the reality of American hegemony, 
and the role the US could have in influencing a decision in Kashmir, given its past 
relationship with Pakistan. Relations between India and the US had thawed over 
the years, and the end of the Cold Wars simply accelerated, what would be a 
mutually beneficial relationship, between the two largest democracies in the world. 
While externally, India was bordering new horizons, internally and especially in 
Kashmir, the situation was not ideal. It continued to mutely watch the political 
decay the state was experiencing, and seemed resigned to the fact that the future 
lay in the hands of violence, as the secessionist movements gathered steam and 
the insurgency gained a Pakistani seal of approval.
3.2 Secessionism
While the roots of the insurgency were sown in the period up till 1987, the 
insurgency itself hit full steam in 1989. It would be unfair to deem the entire period 
of the last twenty years as one of insurgency, a more appropriate moniker would 
perhaps be the 'Rise of Kashmiri Secessionism48. A new younger modern 
Kashmiri had heralded this rise, and politically it would be fair to divide the 
secessionists on the basis of their ideology and perspectives, which would later 
influence their role in the armed struggle and insurgency that would follow. The 
Kashmiri secessionists, in the early 90's could be divided into to main branches, 
those who favoured self-determination and a stronger (sometimes secular) 
Kashmir, created by merging Jammu and Kashmir with Azad Kashmir and those 
who favoured, making all of Kashmir a part of Pakistan or at least an Islamic state
47 Chiriyankandath J, Realigning India: Indian foreign policy after the Cold War (The Round Table, 
Volume 93, Number 374, April 2004)
48 Rajat Ganguly, India, Pakistan and the Kashmir Dispute (Asian Studies Institute & Centre for 
Strategic Studies : 2003)
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with close ties to Pakistan.
The first group of secessionists, comprised largely of the empowered 
Kashmiri youth, who for the first time, could express their voice. They were 
represented in a majority by the JKLF49, a secessionist party founded in Azad 
Kashmir, which espoused the formation of a secular state encompassing both 
Kashmir and Azad Kashmir for all Kashmiris, irrespective of religion. The JKLF 
had charismatic leadership, Yasin Malik was an inspiration to the majority of the 
youth in the early 90's along with his peers Shabir Shah and Jawed Mir, who 
formed the face of the JKLF. The JKLF, in its ideology was largely peaceful, when 
it started out. Intent on self-determination, they believed that politically they could 
change the direction the wind was blowing, and acquire what a majority of 
Kashmiri youth at that time wanted, an independent Kashmir.
However the JKLF was not the only political outfit that was competing for 
the attention of the Kashmiris, more radical Islamist parties and ones with close 
ties to Pakistan like the Jaimit I Islam and the Jammu and Kashmir People’s 
League, all commanded fair followings especially within the valley regions. Both 
segments, the pro-independence and the pro-Pakistan groups, called for a 
plebiscite as a first step, an argument that the Indian government would not sway 
to. As far as Delhi was concerned, the plebiscite was ruled out as an option when 
the Kashmir assembly acceded to India in 1952, and believed its point was 
furthered by the Shimla Accord. All this however did not go down well with the 
different outfits that were now forming in Kashmir.
As, the secessionist movement gradually disintegrated into a violent 
insurgency and a proxy war, the more moderate secessionist parties, were 
becoming increasingly less relevant. The JKLF was fighting a losing battle 
against the numerous, hardliner factions that were springing up and by the end of
49 South Asian Terrorism Portal , JKLF Website accessed on 17 April 2007 
(http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/terrorist_outfits/jammu_&_kashmirJiber 
ation_front.htm)
35 | H R I S H A B H S A N D I L Y A I E P S  2 0 0 5 - 2 0 0 7
K A S H M I R  T H E  L A S T  T W E N T Y  Y E A R S  : M O V I N G  T O W A R D S  T H E  F U T U R E
1993, it no longer could represent a pan-Kashmiri voice. Amidst the rising of 
violence a new group emerged, the All Party Hurriyat Conference (APHC an 
alliance formed in 1993, a majority of whose parties supported independence or 
accession to Pakistan. While the APHC might have things in common with the 
JKLF, it refused to eschew violence as an option, and some of the hardliner 
members of the APHC,
3.3 The Insurgency and Proxy War
An analysis of the insurgency over the 13 year (1989 -  2002) phase that it 
was most active, would best be made by dividing the insurgency into three 
phases, in order to understand the causative agents and the effects they had, 
better. The first, took seed from the secessionist movement. It was a political 
uprising, unhappiness with the powers that were there , characterised by civil 
disturbances, public gatherings and much discontent. The second phase was the 
channelling of the unhappiness and discontent, into a more aggressive and 
sometimes violent outlet. This was the JKLF at its best, Kashmiri youth, who 
believed they had a cause (maybe rightly so) and set out to do the best they could 
about it, there was an uprising, violent as it was; it was not terrorism or a complete 
proxy war. As this second phase began to wane, because of the different outfits 
that emerged, all claiming to speak for the Kashmiri youth, and the strife within 
them, it is when the proxy-war began, uprising turned to terrorism, and infiltrators 
were sent in from across the border.
The JKLF was initially being trained and funded by the ISI as early as 
198850, the Pakistani army provided it military support and cover as JKLF roamed 
both sides of the LOC, however, the JKLF’s strong pro-Independence inclinations, 
soon had the ISI reconsidering its aid. The emergence of strong pro-Pakistani 
insurgency groups like the Hizbul Mujahedeen and the Harqat ul Mujahedeen 
(now the Harkat ul Ansar) many of whose members were formerly a part of the
50 Sanjoy Hazarika, Strangers in the Mist (Australia : Penguin, 2003) Page 93
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JKLF, gave the ISI alternatives, and it was at this period, when the JKLF realised 
that it could no longer fight a military battle, it was also when the number of jihadis 
or non- Kashmiri insurgents, increased, and what was a fight for self- 
determination, soon became a Pakistani backed proxy-war.
The question one tends to ask is why did an ethno-religious uprising break 
out 40 years, after the conflict in Kashmir had begun. A single simple answer is 
difficult to arrive at but the simple truth about the impact the insurgency had, can 
be seen from the facts, it was a disastrous loss of life and the complete destruction 
of normalcy in the state. The estimated toll since 1990, is over 40,00051 people 
have been killed in Kashmir, about half of them are civilians; According to official 
handouts, 2477 civilians had been killed by Indian security forces, 6673 civilians 
and 1593 security personnel had been killed by the militants amounting to a total 
of 19,866 killings (counting 8000+ militants) as of 1998, including 982 Hindus and 
Sikhs killed as of 1999. An estimated 36,000 Hindu families and 20,00052 Muslim 
families as of 1993 had fled the Valley and many were languishing in the refugee 
camps in Jammu.
While critics debate whether India’s strong tactics in Kashmir worked, the 
strategy behind which has been analysed later in the thesis. The period from 
2002 onwards, has been relatively less violent in comparison with the past .Army 
figures maintain that there has been a significant drop in the number of terrorists 
killed and attacks since that period, largely due to pressure on Pakistan, to stop 
support of the proxy-war and attempts at brokering peace that Delhi has made53. 
However the insurgency is by no means over, there continue to exist over 5054 
different militant groups in Kashmir, and there is regular gunfire between security 
forces and insurgents.
51 India’s Kashmir Policy, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, (New Delhi : 2006)
52 India’s Kashmir Policy, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, (New Delhi : 2006)
53 BBC News - PM Vajpayee’s Ramzan Cease Fire. Website accessed on 14 April 2007 
(http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/south_asia/1043144.stm)
4 International Crisis Group Report - Kashmir, Learning from The Past (New York : ICG, April 
2001)
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3.4 Pakistan's Strategic Policy and the Proxy War
The internal rebellion that occurred within Kashmir was a blessing in 
disguise for Pakistani strategy at that period. At first treated with apprehension, as 
previous Pakistani attempts to foment uprising against India had failed, particularly 
the much criticised 'Operation Gibraltar1. Once it became clear that the 
disappointment with Delhi was tangible, and it could translate into bigger things, 
there was a perceptible shift in the status quo policy that Pakistan had followed in 
the past few years. Throughout the 80's, Pakistan had been content with keeping 
its possessions and embarking upon a nuclear weapon programme, with the idea 
that once, the countries came to a military stalemate, where the losses from a 
prospective war over Kashmir, outweighed any possible gains, the countries would 
be forced to talk peace.
Once the rebellion in Kashmir began, Pakistan saw its biggest opportunity 
to highlight its viewpoints in the international community, while it actively supported 
the insurgency on its soil, and provided weapons, training and assistance. The 
various objectives Pakistan's strategy served, can be summarised as; firstly it 
would prove to everyone how undeniable Pakistan's claim to Kashmir was, 
secondly and most importantly, keeping with its main thought on the issue -  it 
could force India back on to the negotiating table, and thirdly in case the issue 
took a military turn, Pakistan would be slightly better placed, if the Indian Army 
was consistently preoccupied with dealing with a relentless internal strife55. It is 
however impossible to correctly measure the actual involvement of Pakistan in the 
Insurgency, given the different levels of support Pakistan itself has admitted to.
Pakistan's tacit support for its proxy war continued deep into the 90's and to 
a point its strategy was successful, when compared to what it had set out to do. 
The proxy war would have an increasing financial burden on the Indian economy 
due to the vast number of forces thatjndia pushed into Kashmir as well as result
55 Vernon Hewitt, Towards the Future (Cambridge : Portland Books, 2001) Pages 164-171
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in a large loss of life. From a Pakistani point of view ,the insurgency in Kashmir 
was its opportunity to stride forward with its plans to force a solution with India56. 
Internationally it presented the outbreak as a sign of the Kashmiri people's need 
for independence from India and reiterated past calls for international intervention 
and a UN Plebiscite. On the international relations front, Pakistan had India on the 
back foot, it highlighted the growing human rights abuses, as the violence 
continued, it rallied Islamic nations around its cause, and for the first few years 
succeeded in embarrassing India internationally. The UK and US recognising this 
and calling for India to review the presence of its security forces in Kashmir, at one 
point in the early 90’s, hurting India diplomatically. Additionally, Pakistan's strategy 
during this period would have a number of lasting repercussions on present 
Pakistani foreign policy which would follow the onset of the proxy war. They are 
underlined as follows:
As with the success in the Afghan Wars through the 80's the second proxy 
war Pakistan fought in Kashmir would continue to consolidate power within the 
hands of. the military and the ISI. It also furthered the dependency political 
decision makers had on the ISI, which therefore enabled the Army and the ISI a 
free hand in plotting and running the country's defence systems. Another 
consequence of the proxy war as mentioned before was the deeply fundamentalist 
undertone, which Pakistan's policy would echo for the entire next decade. In 
supporting the jehadis Pakistan had now made itself part of the holy war against, 
except instead of fighting for a Kashmiri cause, it would fight for its own
3.5 India's Strategy
Strategically India, suffered in the initial period of the insurgency, while its 
tactics might have been exemplary, its overall strategy in Kashmir at the beginning
56 Sumantra Bose, Kashmir, Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace (London : Harvard, 2003) Pages 
102-110
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seemed rather intransigent. By 1994, India had close to 500,00057 forces 
stationed in Kashmir, the paramilitary Border Security Force (BSF) and the army, 
being the largest contributors. It was in from this period (1990-95) when the most 
human rights abuses took place, and the forces present were accused of high­
handed behaviour. However in response to the diplomatic onslaught brought 
about Pakistan, the Indian approach to Kashmir got a lot smarter. The Terrorism 
and Disruptive Activities (TADA) Act under which close to 76000 arrests had been 
made was repealed and India realised that it would not win the battle militarily. 
Delhi then further tried to counter the militancy and regain Kashmiri trust, by a shift 
of from military to political means, with national and state elections in 1996, which 
by this time had limited effect. The APHC members refused to stand for election. 
While the elections seemed to be reasonably fair, there were widespread 
allegations of people being forced to vote,. Eventually when Farooq Abdullah and 
the NC won again, it was not a surprise. However the election had been robbed 
of its validity in Kashmiri eyes with no APHC or any other dissident candidates, 
there had been little choice. Whatever little hope there was for this NC 
government rested in the belief that the moderate government, might be able to 
broker some sort of a peace but this was soon forgotten.
India can been accused of pursuing a ‘hard-line’ policy in Kashmir 
throughout the period of the insurgency, with little or no concern for local thought 
and sentiment, amongst the other options available -  the simple rationale being 
that India was a secular state, and any questions thrown at it questioning the basis 
of this secularity had to be answered decisively, it meant meeting force with force. 
Once the insurgency acquired a foreign ‘flavour’ India could not be seen as being 
soft on i t . Critics have questioned this to quite a length58. It was Delhi’s inability 
to create stable political institutions that would meet the expectations of Kashmiris, 
and Delhi’s manipulative policies towards the state, which had led to the alienation 
of the state in the first place. “A nuanced approach, privileging a 'hearts and
57 International Crisis Group Report - Kashmir, Learning from The Past (New York : ICG, April 2001)
58 See Surnit Ganguly, Explaining the Kashmir Insurgency: Political Mobilization and Institutional 
Decay (International Security, Vol. 21, No. 2. (Autumn, 1996), pp. 76-107)
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minds' campaign, as against a bean count approach, could have furnished the 
grounds to revert to a functional political process. ”59
Why India chose this ‘hard-line’ option can be understood in some contexts, 
but eventually this would lead to disaster within the state. An aggressive stance 
against terrorism, entailed a simple reduction of terrorism to India, it meant killing 
the terrorists. The military and the paramilitary forces in Kashmir at the height of 
the insurgency were not counter-terrorist operatives, they were an army, trained 
for defence of a nation and not to understand the motives and psyche behind an 
insurgency The prevailing environment that was created by India’s policy and the 
need to eliminate terrorists, led to a huge number of human rights abuses, 
innocent civilians being targeted and errors on the part of the paramilitary forces. 
This was not the intended aim of the campaign. UA defensive attitude and 
instrumental use o f the human rights issue in the larger propaganda war lead to 
squandering an opportunity to regain the confidence o f the people through 
appropriate punitive action against errant security force elements. ”60
India squandered an opportunity to take a nuanced approach and reduce 
the intensity of the insurgency, at different occasions during the insurgency. While 
a use of force may have been justified, Delhi and the Srinagar failed to take a 
people-centric approach and the fundamental fallacy being their inability to solve 
this problem politically
3.6 Going Nuclear
Seven years into the insurgency, and faint hopes for progress on Kashmir 
were raised after the elections. Farooq Abdullah’s return to power had raised 
expectations for the possibility of a moderate led settlement. Secretary level talks
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59 India’s Kashmir Policy, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (New Delhi : 2006)
60 India's Kashmir Policy, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, (New Delhi : 2006)
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were restarted in 1997, leading to a fair level of optimism.61 However the 
insurgency raged on within Kashmir, and politically India was in a period of 
instability. After the collapse of a two-year centrist coalition government , the 
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), emerged the winner in fresh elections and the 
advent of a right wing nationalistic party at the helm of power in Delhi was bound 
to have repercussions, that would echo in India's policy national security policies 
and the way it looked at Pakistan. The changes were imminent, and within a few 
months of coming into power a BJP led India, tested a several nuclear weapons in 
Rajasthan, breaking a twenty four year voluntary moratorium on testing that India 
had set upon itself.
The tests were bound to have an impact, and fears of a nuclear arm race, 
were ignited across the world. Indian politicians even added to the rhetoric, by 
stating that now there was a change in strategic power within South Asia, and that 
Pakistan should pay heed to this. All in all, with this and intense pressure from the 
military, Nawaz Sharif gave in, and ordered Pakistan's nuclear tests, fully aware of 
implications this would have for the region. Surprisingly the nuclear tests, did not 
really serve to escalate tensions that Kargil later would, in November 98, a few 
months after the tests, the countries played cricket, and hope was afresh with 
'cricket diplomacy'. When PM Vajpayee travelled across the Wagah border, to 
Lahore in January ‘99, and signed the infamous Lahore accord, many thought that 
India and Pakistan were on the path to becoming responsible nuclear powers, 
when both decided to revert back to original positions, and voluntary moratoriums 
on nuclear testing. All this however did not go down well with the Army, which was 
pursuing its own agenda in Kargil and indulged in the public support that 
Pakistanis had shown for the nuclear test. While the nuclear tests, certainly did 
draw away some attention from Kashmir the link between the two can not be over 
stated. The nuclear tests had served to remind the world that there still existed 
instability in the subcontinent and at the forefront the problem with Kashmir that
61 Rajat Ganguly, India, Pakistan and the Kashmir Dispute Asian Studies Institute & Centre for 
Strategic Studies, 2003
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could not be forgotten.
3.7 Kargil
By the end of the 90's Kashmiri tacit support for Pakistan's proxy war in the 
valley, had begun to recede, even to the point where Kashmiris in some places 
had begun to turn openly hostile to the presence of non-Kashmiri militants and 
mercenaries. At this stage, the support for the insurgency was declining, and the 
burgeoning number of Indian security forces, had begin to assume charge of this 
proxy war, much to the chagrin of Pakistan's military generals, who had secretly 
made plans to revitalise this campaign, while in the forecourt, Prime Minister 
Nawaz Sharif, was talking peace and diplomacy in the Lahore Agreement62 he 
signed in January 1999, after PM Vajpayee’s bus diplomacy overtures.
Indian forces had discovered in May 1999, that a number of armed 
infiltrators had made it across the LOC in Kargil and had taken strategic positions 
on the Srinagar -  Leh National Highway 1A, a major arterial road in west Kashmir, 
and the only supply route to the Siachen Glacier, the world's highest battlefield 
and a strategic strongpoint controlled by India, that had been subject to 
continuous low intensity battle for the past decade and a half. The infiltrators were 
in a position to threaten India's communication with its troops on the glacier. It has 
been estimated that that at the height of the infiltration, the intruders had taken 
close to a 100 square kilometres of land across the LOC in Kargil63. The outcome 
of this was an immediate build-up of Indian troops, and attempts to recover lost 
terrain in a brief, but precise war fought between May -  July 1999. The Indian 
forces recovered the hills that surrounded the highway, and then turned their 
attention to driving the infiltrators back across the LOC.
This campaign, was marked by the use of precision laser bombing by the
62 The Lahore Agreement was signed on 21 Feruary 1999, by Nawaz Sharif and AB Vajpayee in 
Lahore, full text can be found in the Annex VI
63 Global Security - The 1999 Kargil Conflict, Global Security 
(http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/kargil99.htm)
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IAF, combined with the Bofors Howitzer guns of the Indian Army, leading to a 
quick annihilation of the intruders capabilities and it would set the tone for India's 
future reaction to the Pakistan sponsored voyeuristic missions across the LOC. 
The Kargil conflict was an example of the confused rhetoric that Pakistan's 
strategy towards Kashmir was eschewing, after the proxy war had began to ebb in 
the late 90's64. Kargil, was a simple extension of its previous policy, military 
backed infiltrators creating havoc, however this was the first time such a large 
scale attempt had been made to acquire this magnitude of terrain, without officially 
involving the Pakistani army.
The Kargil conflict ended in relatively heavy losses for the Pakistani Army, 
India, with its aggressive yet measured response to the infiltrators and by not 
crossing the LOC, had acquired the sympathies of the International community by 
large, and had succeeded in pressurising the Pakistani PM to make a speech in 
Washington DC, announcing the Pakistani Army's withdrawal and end to the 
conflict. In some ways this was a highly embarrassing end to a conflict that 
Pakistan, had hoped to gain from tactically. The embarrassing end to Kargil, 
would lead to a military coup, in the following months, with General Musharraf, 
making full use of public disenchantment with Nawaz Sharif’s regime, and stage a 
coup d ’etat
Kargil today, remains the only war two nuclear neighbours have ever 
fought. An analysis of the events in 1999, would lead us to the following 
conclusions, it was at this stage that Pakistan realised that it could not continue 
antagonising the international community, with threats to war especially the US, as 
it would entail crippling political and economical consequences, that Pakistan 
could ill afford and secondly, India's aggressive response to the situation had 
shown her willingness to escalate the conflict into a full scale war, if needed, not 
paying heed to the nuclear deterrence factor. It was a key point which showed 
Pakistan that it could not indulge in games like these, and India's ability to retaliate
64 Dr Shireen Mazari, Re-examining Kargil (Defence Journal: June 2000)
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with equal measure also created a certain amount of apprehension in the world 
order, over the happenings on the subcontinent.
Another landmark in the Kargil crisis was the role the US played in bringing 
about peace. President Clinton's skilful diplomacy at the height of the crisis 
brought him a lot of respect in India, especially when the year before his regime 
had been perpetrators of crippling sanctions in the wake of the nuclear tests. His 
visit to the subcontinent in the twilight of his presidential career, was the final 
stamp on the new dynamics the India -  US -  Pakistan relationship would acquire. 
In the words of his Special Advisor on South Asia affairs, Bruce Reidel “the clarity 
of the American position on Kargil and its refusal to give Pakistan any reward for 
its aggression had an immediate and dynamic impact on the relationship. Doors 
opened in New Delhi to Americans that had been shut for year’’65
65 Bruce Reidel, American Diplomacy and the 1999 Kargil Summit at Blair House (CASI, University 
of Pennsylvania : 2002)
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66 Not to Scale Map depicting events in Kargil in May 1999, Global Security 
(http://www.globalsecurity.org /military/world/war/images//krg3.gif) Website accessed on March 12 
2007
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4. 9/11 ONWARDS AND THE US ROLE
4.1 The Scenario Post 9/11
The terrorist attacks on 9/11 served to alter further the unstable geopolitical 
environment in South Asia. Towards the end of the Clinton regime and at the 
beginning of the millennium, diplomatically India had been largely successful, with 
its strategy to isolate Pakistan within the international community, a move 
hastened by President Musharraf’s coup and the general distrust of Pakistan67 
post Kargil. Another important advantage it had gained was the implicit 
international recognition the sanctity of the LOC had received, that the UN 
resolutions were no longer valid and any steps forward from here would have to 
begin at the LOC. However 9/11, changed a lot of things, it brought Pakistan into 
the centre of the action, much like the Afghan campaign did, soon making it 
indispensable, in the eyes of many again.
These changes, which certainly impacted India, had a telling effect on 
Pakistani strategy and later in Kashmir. The three main consequences, on 
Pakistan's policy within the region can be summarised as follows; President 
Bush's declaration that it would make no differentiation between regimes that 
harboured terrorists and terrorists themselves, India could then use this to up the 
ante, and ask Pakistan to halt support to the terrorists on Pakistani soil, secondly 
the risk derived from continuing support for cross-border terrorism, would 
jeopardise greater US national and international security interests. Pakistan could 
not afford to antagonise the Americans, and finally, the financial and economic 
benefits would aid the restructuring of a collapsing Pakistani economy, in 
exchange for exercising restraint in its policy with Kashmir68
67 Engagement, not containment, (The Hindu Online : Jan 26 2000) Website accessed on 21 April 
2007 (http://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/2000/01/26/stories/05262523.htm)
68 Captain Matthew Taylor, Pakistan’s Kashmir Policy And Strategy Since 1947 (Monterrey : Naval 
Postgraduate School, March 2004)
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Expanding further on Bush's decision to hold regimes that harboured 
terrorism accountable, along with the terrorists; it put a spoke in the wheel of 
Pakistan's proxy war strategy in Kashmir. When the Taliban failed to hand over 
Osama Bin Laden, after President Musharraf, requested twice, Musharraf knew 
his support for the Taliban had to end. His speech in September, indicating that 
Pakistan would have to support the US, in their war on terror, in order not to be 
branded a terrorist state. Yet Musharraf thought that he could support the war on 
terror and yet continue with the proxy war strategy in Kashmir69. In the same 
speech he talked about Kashmir being a part of Pakistan's core strategy and that 
Pakistan would support the freedom struggle there, a move necessary given the 
obvious Indian attempt to pinpoint Kashmir as a global terrorism problem, which 
the US would have to acknowledge. As a result, while certain ‘cosmetic’ 
measures were taken to end cross-border terrorism, in reality radical organisations 
continued to exist within Pakistan and in Kashmir.
In a perfect example of this terrorists attacked the State Assembly in 
Srinagar, killing dozens of innocents, clear proof that Musharraf was indulging in 
doublespeak. A few months later December 2001, was another flashpoint, formed 
out of the Kashmir situation. A few months after the war on terror had begun, 
militants attacked the Indian Parliament in Delhi. This daring strike at the heart of 
India, led to the largest mobilization of troops along the border with Pakistan by 
India. Accusing Pakistan of indulging in cross-border terrorism, India likened the 
attack to the World Trade Centre bombings, and was willing to use the same 
American premise to attack training camps on Pakistani military soil. Pakistan 
responded with a troop build up as well. Tensions continued to be raised, within 
this period, with both sides, refusing to budge, the Indian Deputy PM Advani, even 
flew to Washington in attempt to convey to the US, that India would no longer put 
up with this. The US realised this, with CIA director George Tenet calling the 
closes the subcontinent, had come to war since 1971, and that the threat of
69 No decline in Kashmir terror: Police, The Times of India (Srinagar: 26 Dec 2001)
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nuclear conflict was very real70, and prevailed upon both countries to proceed 
cautiously and make attempts to defuse the crisis.
After the attack on Parliament and the May 2002 crisis when militants 
attacked an Army camp in Jammu killing innocent families of security forces, India 
and Pakistan resumed talks, and the discussions produced some tangible results, 
a cease-fire, along the LOC that both parties have adhered to, the restoration of 
diplomatic ties and unrestricted movement for members of the APHC, to travel 
between the two regions. Additionally Pakistan banned also a number of Islamic 
extremist organisations, including the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba and the Jaish-e- 
Mohammad, the biggest Pakistan-backed groups operating in Kashmir. However, 
as with other banned organisations, they re-emerged under different names and 
remained active across the LOC. In November 2003, Islamabad once again 
banned many of the renamed organisations, including the Jaish, but the activities 
of these organisations have continued.
4.2 The Recent Past
In the last five years, events in and around Kashmir have reflected some 
change in the Pakistani viewpoint. Once the much derailed peace process was 
brought back on track in early 2004, President Musharraf, surprised many with his 
acceptance of the possibility of parallel solutions, moving beyond the age-old 
Pakistani insistence for a plebiscite, mandated by the UN resolution in 194871. 
Musharraf in his interview to Reuters72 talked about demilitarization of Kashmir, 
the division of Kashmir into control based on geographical regions and even Indo- 
Pak joint control. The most important conclusion was his implicit assurance to end 
the Pakistani army support of militant outfits in Kashmir and stop all forms of
70 Sridhar Krishnaswami, 2002, Chances of India-Pak War High: CIA Chief, The Hindu - Online
edition 21 March 2002. Website accessed on 15 March 2007
(http:// www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/2002/03/21/stories/2002032103871100.htm)
1 Peter Lavoy - Pakistan's Kashmir Policy after the Bush Visit to South Asia (Strategic Insight 
Volume V, Issue 4, April 2006)
72 Gen. Musharraf’s interview to Reuters on December 18 2003
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cross-border terrorism.
However the ground reality has not changed much, an analysis of the last 
three years would show a significant drop in the number of deaths in Kashmir as 
well as an Indian acknowledgment of reduction but definitely not the end of cross- 
border terrorism. Infiltration rates have dropped significantly, but at no point has 
this been the end of the insurgency. There still exist massive amounts of security 
forces in the region, close to 400,00073 as per current estimates, all this in spite of 
democratically elected government, which came to power in 2002, in what was 
one of the fairest elections Kashmir has seen. However quiet the current scenario 
is in comparison to the early 90’s at the peak of the insurgency, it can not be 
described as tranquil. Infrequent demonstrations against Indian rule, bomb blasts 
and regular gunfire between security forces and insurgents continue. 
Furthermore, there is a significant amount of the Muslim population in the valley, 
which continues to feel alienated from India, but instead of preferring Pakistan, if 
given a choice, a majority would chose self-governance in some form or the other.
While Musharraf, made promises in the past he has still failed to deliver on 
them completely. Under immense pressure from religious hardliners and 
theocrats and their allies in parliament, he has had to show some progress in 
Kashmir, therefore Pakistani hidden support to the insurgents continues, India too 
can be accused of taking its own time, though in the last few months, PM 
Manmohan Singh, has come up with his own solution for Pakistan, and said he is 
willing to talk to the APHC, about autonomy and self-governance. While India has 
dragged its feet on political measures, it will not with military measures,. 
Government and public patience with Kashmir has run out. Bombs in Delhi in 
2005 and the shocking train blasts in Mumbai, in July 2006, have ensured that 
India will not tolerate this anymore.
In 2006, when the process looked like it was stagnating, Musharraf and PM
73 Sumit Ganguly, Will Kashmir Stop India’s Rise (Foreign Affairs : Vol. 85, Issue 4, August 2006) 
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Singh met in Havana, Cuba at the Non-Aligned Movement Summit they reiterated 
their commitment to peace, since then the foreign ministers have met, and 
secretary-level talks continue. While the pace of steps taken remains slow, the 
two sides have embarked on a number of CBM’s, as the name suggests to build 
trust amongst each other and each other’s institutions. Also within Kashmir, there 
seems to be political movement,. The APHC, has recognised that PM Singh is 
sincere in his attempt at defusing the situation, and even the Hizbul Mujahedeen is 
willing to return to the table for talks and has agreed that violence and the loss of 
lives have not lead to any gains.
4.3 The US Role
Looking at the US Role in a post September 11, security environment, US 
relations have considerably strengthened between with India, and have also 
moved improved with Islamabad a far cry, from the testing times in May 2001, 
when Armitage, stopped short of calling Pakistan a rogue state. While this brought 
India and the US together on the same side of the war against terrorism, all the 
focus was back on Pakistan, the frontline of the campaign. India was at first 
disconcerted by the fact that the US was giving Pakistan undue attention, but 
realised that it too, had stakes in the war on terror.
However to the credit of the US, the two relationships have remained 
delinked from each other. While it designated Pakistan a ‘major non-NATO ally’ it 
continued to engage New Delhi on the other issues. An analysis of the US -  India 
relationship would tell you that the current India -  US relationship, is built on a 
boarder platform which engages both countries in co-operation on a variety of 
levels74. This highlights the shifts in foreign policy of both countries which had 
their origins in the end of the cold war. The landmark civilian nuclear co-operation 
deal that was signed in 2006, was a telling testament to how policy had changed,
74 Francine Kiefer, A crucial US rôle in India-Pakistan feud (Christian Science Monitor; 12/31/2001, 
Vol. 94 Issue 26, p1, Op, 1c)
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the US no longer thought India was a nuclear pariah, by awarding de facto nuclear 
status, it had recognised India as a partner. If the US swayed international 
support towards Pakistan in the 1971 war, during Kargil, it made up for that75. In 
the past few years levels of co-operation have increased, joint military exercises, 
naval cooperation and vast increases in trade have helped sweeten things 
between the two countries.
The role the US will play in Kashmir is closely linked to the emerging 
strategic partnership that India and the US are currently enjoying. A partnership 
based on the fundamental premise of democracy, of shared values and 
institutions, a belief in market forces as drivers of economic growth and the 
convergence of regional security interests. Another factor defining its role is the 
need the US has for Pakistan in its continuing war on terror. Yet developing a 
common policy for Pakistan remains the biggest obstacle in the prospect of the 
India -  US strategic partnership76.
While the India -  US -  Pakistan relationship remains largely delinked, US 
policy with Pakistan, still affects the way India views things. Pakistan is an 
unstable nuclear state, and it is of utmost concern to both India and the US, that 
these weapons and technology do not fall into the wrong hands. The proliferation 
episode with AQ Khan the Pakistan’s nuclear mastermind, alarmed both countries. 
In addition, the American relationship with Islamabad today seems to be more of a 
business partnership, than one with that will enjoy genuine close ties in the future. 
The focus with Islamabad has remained to be the war in Afghanistan, countering 
nuclear proliferation and building support for the US’ general strategy in the Middle 
East. Additionally the US and India have seen Pakistan, as a source of major 
Islamic radicalisation as well.
Yet today Pakistan is the US’s closest ally in the war on terror. Its
75 Parag Khanna, C Raja Mohan, Getting India Right (Policy Review. Washington: Feb/Mar 2006)
76 Devin Haggerty, US Policy and the Kashmir Dispute: Prospects for Resolution (India Review; 
Jul2003, Vol. 2 Issue 3, p89-116, 28p)
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emergence on the frontline after 2001, galvanised the Musharraf regime. Faced 
with an American ultimatum, Musharraf abandoned his former partners in crime 
the Taliban, overnight. He was duly rewarded, from being an autocratic dictator, 
who had compromised democracy, the US recognised him and Pakistan as a 
major non-NATO ally, in 2004. American bilateral aid resuscitated Pakistan’s 
failing economy,. There is no doubt today that had the war on terror not begun, 
economically Pakistan would be heading to failure. However “Peace in Kashmir 
will require a new U.S. policy toward Pakistan”77. The US can no longer continue 
supporting autocratic military dictators as it has done in the past. Communism 
and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, may have been valid reasons, in a 
bipolar world, but today with its responsibility as the hegemonic power, it must 
persuade Pakistan to shift its policy in Kashmir, and to shift it away from proxy-war. 
The strategy behind which is simple, the US needs to convince Pakistan that its 
future is an interest for US national security78 and with the financial package and 
commitment that the US is showing Pakistan, Pakistan must assume the 
responsibilities that accompany this, by cracking down on the radical militancy, in 
both national and international interests. All this is echoed by the American think 
tank which claimed that if the US did not take an activist role in conflict resolution, 
strife in South Asia would pose a major threat to American national security79.
In summary, the US role is an essential part of any solution to Kashmir. Its 
continued presence militarily in the Middle East and Afghanistan, impact the role 
and the importance that Pakistan receives and it also creates a common enemy 
for the US in radical Islam, that forms an arc that extends from the Middle East to 
Pakistan and Kashmir. The impact the US has on Pakistan, can be used positively 
if America can position world opinion to pressure Pakistan into stopping cross- 
border terrorism and use its own economic and defence ties with Islamabad to 
urge for a solution. Any response from the radical Islamic elements that exist in
77 Sumit Ganguly, Will Kashmir Stop India’s Rise (Foreign Affairs : Vol. 85, Issue 4, August 2006)
78 Captain Matthew Taylor, Pakistan’s Kashmir Policy And Strategy Since 1947 (Monterrey : Naval 
Postgraduate School, March 2004)
79 Council on Foreign Relations -  Independent Task Force on India and South Asia November 
2003,Conclusions
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this arc, against the US, will find support in Kashmir, radical Islam views the US 
and India with the same eye, a common enemy, therefore violence against a US 
led presence, will always have a spill over effect in Kashmir80. Also both countries 
realise that if Pakistan fails as a state, this arc of fundamentalism, would soon 
erupt into an arc of violence, a grave thereat that must be accounted for. As 
mentioned before, the US’ strategic ties with India, too can influence a solution. In 
order to explore the full potential of strategic cooperation with India, the US must 
change its Kashmir policy; it can no longer continue ignore the genuineness of the 
Indian claim and the deft Pakistani challenges that continue. The time to act for 
the US is now but “the U.S. must be careful about assuming that it can succeed in 
satisfying both India and Pakistan simultaneously by way o f what it views as 
incremental and mutually exclusive bilateral armament.”81
80 Jaswant Singh the former Indian External Affairs Minister in a speech given 19 May 2007
81 Parag Khanna, C Raja Mohan, Getting India Right (Policy Review. Washington: Feb/Mar 2006)
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5. MOVING TOWARDS THE FUTURE
5.1 What Does the Future Hold for Kashmir?
After sixty years of meaningless posturing on Kashmir, it would seem that 
India and Pakistan are no further in their quest for a solution to the problem that 
seems to be the centre of their existence. It appears that every time, India and 
Pakistan took a step forward in the past, it seemed to be followed by two 
backwards, with Kashmir and Kashmiri people, losing out eventually. Given all 
that has occurred, a certain amount of pessimism would be expected, yet today 
there is a glimmer of hope, an almost imperceptible whisper, filling the corridors in 
Delhi and Islamabad, about the possibility of a solution. While a solution may not 
be imminent, there certainly is agreement across the spectrum, that for the first 
time in a while, the current impetus, being given to this umpteenth peace initiative, 
seems to be one that could carry it through82. There have been various 
indications to the above, which are outlined below;
• The current initiative is now almost two years old and for the first time, it is 
one that has encompassed all levels of government from top to bottom in 
both countries, from both leaders who met in Cuba to the secretary level 
talks focussing on CBM’s and all echoing one thought, the steps to a 
solution.
• Both sides, have realised the need for flexibility, while recognising each 
other’s seeming intractable positions in trying to accommodate different 
perspectives83. Whether this will work needs to be seen.
• Kashmiris themselves are tired of the violence. While they have never
82 Kashmir Solution on Cards -  Mufti, Rashid Ahmad in the Hindustan Times, Srinagar 14 May 
2007
83 Peace process between Pak-lndia to continue: Saifullah (Islamabad : Associated Press of 
Pakistan, Feb 21 2007)
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shown affection for Indian forces in the region, they have finally come to
peace with them, as well as the violence and death have taken effect on 
their spirit, yet it seems that normalcy is returning to the valley for the first 
time in 15 years84
• Politicians in both Azad Kashmir and Kashmir are looking less
confrontational, especially in Kashmir with state elections scheduled for
later this year, talks continue with the moderate factions of the APHC, to 
ensure representation in the elections85.
• A framework of peace is being worked out, Musharraf’s 4 point plan and 
Manmohan Singh’s idea for a Naya Kashmir seems to have passed muster 
within their countries. A future solution will probably incorporate some 
aspects of both.
• Finally, terror is not going to derail the peace process86, shocking blasts in 
Mumbai in July 2006 and the more recent blasts on the Samjhauta Express 
train, which runs from Amritsar to Lahore, may have caused hiccups and 
while India accused and paused the peace process, it did not rescind its 
decision like it has in the past.
In concluding that a lasting peace is imminent and guaranteed, would be 
foolhardy but is certainly is plausible. In order to understand better why the above 
indicators mean so much, it is necessary to have a clearer understanding of the 
geo-strategic positions of India and Pakistan, which is outlined more clearly in the 
next section.
84 Normalcy Returns to the Valley in a Statement by Indian Union Minister of State, S Jaiswal, 
Greater Kashmir Online Edition. Website Accessed on 28 May 2007. 
(http://www.greaterkashmir.com/Latest_story. asp?Date=28_5_2007&ltemlD=5&cat=0)
5 Time ripe to resolve Kashmir issue, says PDF, Times of India Online, Srinagar
(http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/lndia/Time_ripe_to_resolve_Kashmir_issue_says_PDF_/articles 
how/2095355.cms) Website Accessed on 28 May 2007
86 India, Pakistan Undeterred by Train Blasts, Christian Science Monitor, 8827729, 2/20/2007, Vol. 
99, Issue 58
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5.2 The Strategic Reasons for a Settlement
After sixty years of ambivalence on the issue, most people question the 
commitment of the powers that be in India and Pakistan, to the settlement of the 
Kashmir dispute. In reality as much as the theory of constructivism, recognises 
the role of social cognitive factors, in the resolution of any conflict, the powers that 
be are representatives of all the social factors87 at the highest level of authority, 
and without them, and the required intent there will be no solution. As mentioned 
before, Indian PM Manmohan Singh, a man whose integrity has never been 
questioned, seems bent on providing a solution or the steps to the solution, while 
he has a chance in power. As a country India will not get the global recognition, it 
desires and deserves until the issue of Kashmir is solved -  something that has 
been linked to its inability to procure a permanent seat on the UN Security Council 
amongst other global ambitions.88
People have different opinions of President Musharraf. He is a man most 
of India mistrusted, after he orchestrated Kargil, six months after an agreement to 
move forward, but in President Musharraf, India may have found a Pakistani 
leader who is in a position to ensure a settlement. There is no denying the role 
the Pakistani army plays in the running of the country. In the past while 
democratic leadership has tried moving forward, it has failed without the backing 
of the Pakistani military - whose influence and power is derived from, the 
dependence of the nation on the army, and as a protector of its ideology in 
Kashmir. Though President Musharraf, in the past agreed to step down as the 
Army Chief, it is a position he will never give up. Without controlling the army, he 
could never control Pakistan. It is for this exact reason, if there is a leader who 
can survive the bargaining over ideologies and enforce the outcomes that any 
settlement would entail, President Musharraf is the man.
87 A detailed explanation of how the theory of constructivism can be used in Kashmir is provided, 
later in the thesis, see page 61
88 J Sri'Raman, Promising a Seat for India? (Global Policy, Sep 2004) Website Accessed on 20 
May 2007 (http.7/www.globalpolicy.org/security/reform/cluster1/2004/0923promising.htm)
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Internationally Pakistan has been riding a wave that is slowly beginning to 
ebb. As a key ally in the NATO lead war on terror, much of the situation post 9/11, 
worked in Pakistan's favour, and led to international recognition of President 
Musharraf at a time, when it seemed the world opinion was beginning to shift to 
India's side. The war on terror saved Pakistan from economic and internal 
collapse and kept Musharraf's regime in place. Today the goodwill or bargaining 
power Musharraf and Pakistan have-acquired over the past few years in spite 
Pakistan’s various misdemeanours89 will not last forever. Additionally, Musharraf 
is beginning to feel the heat from within Pakistan itself - radical Islamists, whom 
the ISI and the Army cultivated in the past, making their presence felt with 
bombings and violence, giving Musharraf a taste of his own medicine. Civil 
society too is expressing discontent - Musharrafs decision to interfere with the 
judiciary, led to mass riots and killings as recently as the week before this was 
written90. It is therefore imperative for Musharraf to preclude a settlement or at 
least the steps to a settlement, something that will be seen as a recognition and 
legitimisation of his regime and himself.
Other facts that preclude settlement are more or less apparent today. 
Economically, militarily and politically there is huge disparity between India and 
Pakistan. As mentioned before, today India is the second fastest growing 
economy in the world, and stands in excess of a trillion dollars91. The size of the 
burgeoning middle class , growing affluence and improvement in quality of life, 
show theft India, will become more vital to the financial world order. Though 
Pakistan, too is finally out of its period of stagnation, led by American aid 
packages and has shown growth of 5-6%, there is simply no comparisons in the
89 Reference here is being made to the AQ Khan Nuclear Proliferation Scandal as well as the 
continued presence of terror groups on Pakistani soil in some form or the other, as well past 
Pakistani support for elements of the Taliban and other extremist organisiations.
90 Juliette Terzief, Musharraf Faces Greatest Challenge Yet (World Politics Review : 18 May 2007) 
(http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/article.aspx?id=784) Website accessed on 20 May 2007
1 India in trillion dollar economy club, CNN-IBN News (http://www.ibnlive.com/news/india-is- 
trilliondollar-economy/41800-7.html) Website accessed on 31 May 2007
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scales of economy of both countries. This simple economic disparity, manifests 
itself in the vast gap in defence capabilities, while Pakistan spends more of its vital 
funds on defence92, instead on its collapsing infrastructure, and tries to modernize, 
India spends far less as percentage of its GDP on defence and has continue to 
widen the bridge between the two countries. Additionally it is this growing 
prosperity that will enable India to bear the costs sustained military presence in the 
region more easily. Further as Kashmiris them selves see the fruits of this 
prosperity within the state and their disappointment with India and the security 
presence in the area (due its newer and fare more effective counter-insurgency 
tactics and improved human rights record), it will become easier for India to win 
back Kashmiri support, all reasons thgt point to the essentiality of settlement.
However it is in the political sphere, that the difference between the two 
countries makes its biggest impact, despite being a flawed democracy, India’s 
political institutions have withstood the test of time, and can only get better in the 
coming years. The political future of Pakistan remains shrouded, short spells of 
democratically elected governments, between military dictatorships, have never 
made for sound political governance, and beyond Kashmir, the existence of 
Pakistan, has always been questioned by this. The last reason why a settlement 
seems imminent, while not completely strategic, is Kashmir and its people them 
selves. For too long they have suffered, first at the hands of Indian apathy and 
abuse, and now fare more with the if lives and the livelihoods at stake, with the 
continued war in their homeland. The people and their representatives have 
realized that there simply is no alternative to peace, and everything must be done 
to arrive at a resolution of the conflict.
It is for these very reasons that the stage seems to be set for consensus on 
Kashmir. India is the status quo power in question, it occupies two-thirds of 
Kashmir, if it is determined to look for a solution, given the current position
92 Pakistan Hikes Defence Spending by 15.5 Percent, (Islamabad : Agence France Presse, 6 
June 2005)
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Pakistan is in, and the reasons above that circumstance is in India’s favour and 
Pakistan will so have to match India’s determination to settle the issue.
5.3 A Pathway to Peace
The first step in creating a pathway for peace is establishing a timeline for 
this. While conflict resolution is not an overnight process, the seriousness of 
intent, can only be judged by a definite timeline. This will stop the current effort 
from being a simple restatement of past events. The current movement forward 
has recognized this and they are in the process of establishing an outline of how 
things can proceed in Kashmir. Intent needs to be built upon with results and 
actions. A lot of groundwork needs to be completed initially, something that both 
parties have to be willing to provide for. The intent for a peace process in Ireland93 
was established years before any watershed agreements; the time in between 
was filled with the necessary groundwork. Additionally in order to understand 
completely the steps that need to be taken, first changes need to be made in 
mindsets in both countries, some of which are underlined below.
Kashmir is special and must be dealt with as such
Pakistan seems to have recognized this, more in their need to claim the entirety of 
Kashmir, than in the actual concern for the differences between Kashmir and its 
people and the rest of Pakistan. Azad Kashmir in theory enjoys a certain amount 
of autonomy in its functioning. However, it is here that India has faulted in the past 
with its constant meddling with Article 370 and the revoking of Kashmir’s special 
status. It is therefore necessary that India restore and preserve this special status, 
something that PM Singh himself has acknowledged94. This accordance of a 
special status will help reduce the alienation a majority of Kashmiris feel towards 
India, This is essential for them to accept this if they want peace. Kashmir is
93
Sumantra Bose, Exploring Peace In Kashmir (London : LSE, Fathom) Website accessed on 
21 May 2007 (http://www.fathom.com/course/10701013/session4.html)
94 India mulls over ’special status’ for held Kashmir, The News, Pakistan, Website accessed on 31 
May 2007, (http://www.thenews.com.pk/top_story_detail.asp?ld=1022)
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special, its position as a Muslim majority state in a Hindu majority nation can not 
be overstated.
Kashmir needs autonomy o f some sort
‘‘Any autonomy package, to be consistent with the basic principles and spirit o f the 
nation’s obligation under the Instrument o f Accession, must therefore recognize at 
the minimum the inviolability o f Article 370, which sets Jammu and Kashmir apart 
from the other states in certain respects and areas."95 Autonomy is not 
necessarily a bad word in this context. Along with the recognition of Kashmir’s 
special status, autonomy too has to go hand-in-hand. Yet autonomy does not have 
to mean independence. An acceptance of the fact that Kashmiris’ have the right to 
a degree of self-determination, will set the stage for discussion with Pakistan and 
Kashmiri political outfits about the degree and level of this autonomy. This too 
has been a fundamental claim of every Kashmiri stakeholder. While Pakistan has 
called its support for the insurgency, support for a freedom movement, given the 
lack of freedoms currently enjoyed in Azad Kashmir96, there is no guarantee 
Pakistan actually backs autonomy in Kashmir. It is therefore necessary that 
Pakistan’s recognition of this be tangible too.
An acceptance that mistakes have occurred and an apology for this 
The Indian government has made huge mistakes with Kashmir in the past- 
mismanagement, interference in democratically elected set-up and human rights 
violations; Yet there is time to make up for this. An unconditional apology to all 
Kashmiris would give India a chance to win over their hearts, something that may 
now be possible, if it is combined with the pent up Kashmiri frustration over 
violence and their chance for economic survival with India. PM Vajpayee 
acknowledged that mistakes had been made in the past and that India would have 
take steps to right the wrongs that have occurred.97 While Pakistan claims that
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95 India’s Kashmir Policy, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, (New Delhi: 2006)
96 Baroness Emma Nicholson, Kashmir (EU Foreign Affairs Committee Report, May 2007)
97 ‘No repetition of J&K mistakes', PM promises assistance to state, The Tribune Online Edition 
(http://www.tribuneindia.com/2003/20030305/main4.htm) Website accessed on 25 May 2007
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people In Azad Kashmir are content, it too has a lot to apologise for, if the latest 
EU Report by Baroness Nicholson on Kashmir is anything to go by, also the 
Pakistani role in the perpetration of violence can not be forgotten either.
Self-confidence within the nations
As mentioned before, the peace process itself, will have opposition for/of ?parties 
who have vested interests in the Kashmir conflict as of now. There is no denying 
the political mileage, right-wing Hindu nationalist parties and organisations in India 
like the Vlshwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) the Rashtriay Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) 
and even mainline political parties like the BJP have got from their rigid stances on 
Kashmir and opposition to Pakistan and hence any solution. Within Pakistan itself 
the role of some elements of the Army and the ISI, has to be mentioned again, 
given the lifeline Kashmir and the consequent India-baiting, provides these 
organizations. Therefore it is vital, that national confidence be built into any 
measures that will be taken The strength of the opposition to a solution cannot be 
measured. However with the increased confidence levels surrounding a solution, 
steps in greater national interests for both countries, should be able to withstand 
any potential backlash.
Changing mindsets within the people o f India and Pakistan 
Constructivism argues that the internationalism today is formed by certain 
cognitive structures that socially construct events that exist in the material world. 
Social actors are represented by states, and the social factors -  ideas, culture, 
religion, economics from -  past, present and future, form the basis on which 
actors construe international reality98. It is my belief, that constructivism, with its 
rise, as a theory in the last decades, has a major role to play in the understanding, 
and perhaps the possible solution to the problem in Kashmir today. Changing pre­
conceived views and perceptions, is a long process, and will not happen 
overnight. The only people, who can do this, are the ones who’ve created these
K A S H M l  R JTHJE L A S T  T W E N T Y  Y E A R S  : M O V I N G  T O W A R D S  T H E  F U T U R E
98 J Ruggie, ‘What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-utilitarianism and the Social 
Constructivist Challenge (International Organization,52, 4, Autumn 1998)
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images, the media, It has over the last few years, in both countries become fairly 
less biased, and portrays truer images. Meanwhile, political and religious 
leadership, has preyed shamelessly and exploited the common man’s ignorance, 
to their benefit. It is essential that today, that leadership in both countries, move 
beyond petty self-interest, and help educate their populace.
The idea here is to build contacts and re-establish old relationships, as in the past. 
If the people can come together to create a more conducive environment with the 
aid of social intercourse, they can build a better official relationship. This can be 
achieved in various ways, e.g.; easier and more flexible visa regimes, scientific 
and cultural thought shares, festivals and greater religious tolerance. Often the 
importance of people-to-people contact is underestimated and undervalued. The 
current peace process which has been in effect from 2003 has had its fair share of 
ups and downs, but support from the public has been consistent. It started with the 
easing of visa regulations for fans during the cricket tours, followed by co­
ordinated relief work and the building of a bridge, after the devastating Kashmir 
earthquake of 2005, and a regular exchange of artisans and cultural ideology. 
However, there is a need to cement this, so it stays in place, independent of the 
governments. Institutionalising it is one way, to ensure that it continues -  
intellectuals and prominent members of society have to ensure this happens.
Imbibing a Kashmiri Spirit
Who or what make a Kashmiri spirit? Kashmiriyat is another vital cog in this 
process. All the steps mentioned above, deal with India and Pakistan on the 
whole, this is one that Kashmiris need to take. The only way Kashmir can recover 
from the past, is by believing in itself and the strength of the Kashmiri people. A 
Kashmiri identity that transcends religious, political and caste barriers in a Kashmir 
that is home to Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists and Sikhs and that binds them 
together to ensure a bright future. Divisive politics and politicians need to change 
tactics and must ensure that the wide gaps between these different groups are 
bridged and that the fabric of Kashmiri society is rebuilt. This involves, the return
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of the displaced Kashmiri pundit population to the valley, harmonization of 
relations between the different communities and an effort from each to ensure that 
a environment for peace and development is returned to Kashmir.
5.4 What Kind of Solution Will We See?
Once the steps above have been taken and the groundwork laid down for a 
solution, the next question that arises is the nature and type of solution or 
settlement that India and Pakistan will arrive at, in accordance with the wishes of 
the Kashmiris. A multitude of options" have been presented in the past, scholars 
have for years researched this topic, and failed to come up with consensus on 
what model would suit Kashmir the best. However it is safe to assume that most 
of the solutions available, would fail to pass muster with either India or Pakistan. 
There seems to be an implicit recognition between both countries, that there can 
be no further movement of borders, and that any solution has to be arrived at 
taking this point into consideration. This is a subtle echo of the very heart of the 
Shimla Agreement, the recognition of the LOC as the de facto border, and the 
need to move on ahead from there.
With PM Singh and President Musharraf reiterating that redrawing borders 
is not an option100, it is obvious that any solution now will have to work around the 
LOC. This seems to be India’s preferred option (albeit not yet officially) and one 
that Pakistan can be made to agree to, it is quite simply the status quo solution. 
However the question of the border is just one in many in terms of a solution, 
more important questions that need to be asked include, what happens to the 
Kashmir and Azad Kashmir, the level of autonomy that these states will enjoy and 
the extent of the involvement of Kashmiri’s in the drafting of a solution as well as 
the framework of for self-rule that will be established for them. The image below
99
A number of options have been provided in Annex VII, Rathnam Indurthy, Kashmir Between 
India and Pakistan, 2003
100 Third Jammu and Kashmir Round-Table —  The way forward, G Parthasarthy (Hindu Business 
Line, May 3 2007.
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depicts the most likely scenario, and the way a status quo solution would be 
structured on the m ap.101
The status quo solution incorporates parts of Musharraf’s plan for Kashmir 
as well as PM Singh’s. With this solution, Azad Kashmir and Kashmir both acquire 
a certain level of autonomy that India and Pakistan remain comfortable with, 
Kashmiris get the framework of self-rule that they are satisfied with, while India 
and Pakistan arrive at a consensus on other things like defence and soft borders. 
This illustration of a status quo solution, remains very basic and indicative in 
nature, as it seems to be the most likely outcome. Arriving at a solution is a 
complicated procedure and the actual dialogue would involve far more detail.
101 The Map above BBC News Special Report on the Kashmir Flashpoint. Website Accessed April 
30, 2007 (http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/in_depth/south_asia/2002/ kashmir_flashpoint/default.stm)
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6. CONCLUSIONS
This thesis so far has addressed the numerous issues that pertain to the 
situation in Kashmir today. It has looked at, analysed and placed past events and 
their consequences within the complicated geopolitical global structures that exist 
today, in order to understand what the future holds for Kashmir. A fair amount of 
optimism has been shown in projecting what the future bodes, optimism that is 
necessary and looks at a future solution as the most possible outcome at this 
stage of the detente. In order to order to draw more accurate conclusions, they 
have been presented in a point format, using the analysis from the thesis
• Kashmir encompasses the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir and the 
autonomous state of Azad Kashmir within Pakistan, is a complex geo­
political issue that has dogged both India and Pakistan over a period of the 
last sixty years. Disputes over the varied geographical terrain and the 
complicated structure of contemporary Kashmiri society are some of the 
factors that have made resolution difficult in the past. Any solution to this 
conflict, would have to recognise the needs and demands of all the 
stakeholders involved, namely India, Pakistan, the Kashmiri people and to 
an extent China which also claims to a part of Kashmir.
• The conflict over Kashmir arose at the time of partition between India and 
Pakistan in 1947, due to a number of reasons. Hari Singh the unpopular 
regent at that time did not accede to either dominion. After a Pakistani 
backed tribal invasion, Kashmir acceded to India, and the army was sent in. 
The legality of this accession has always been challenged by Pakistan and 
other critics of Indian policy at that time. A temporary truce was signed 
along a line known then as the CFL and today as the LOC, depicting the 
positions of both parties in the Kashmir dispute.
• The issue was presented before the UN in 1948, after extensive debate and
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attempts by the Security Council, to obtain a resolution, with Britain trying to 
swing the balance in Pakistan’s favour in keeping with its strategic policy of 
the times A resolution was passed, calling for a plebiscite within the region. 
However till today, none of the requirements of the UNSC resolution have 
ever been fulfilled. Further, India does not recognise this resolution as valid 
given the context of time that has elapsed.
• From the period from 1947 -  1987 efforts were made to solve the dispute 
politically, the UN was involved unsuccessfully and further diplomatic forays 
were attempted. Yet India and Pakistan fought three wars in this period, two 
directly over Kashmir. The seminal Shimla Accord was signed in 1971, at 
the end of the third war, which recognised the sanctity of the LOC, and the 
need to conduct all further negotiations using this recognition as a base. 
Kashmir internally remained in an illusory peace through most of this 
period, with external strife rarely translating into internal unrest.
• It was also within this period from 1947 -  1987 that the roots of the 
secessionist movement and insurgency that followed in the decades after 
were laid. For forty years, New Delhi in attempts to integrate Kashmir into 
the Indian fold, constantly meddled with Kashmiri state politics. From 
appointing and removing chief minister’s to manipulating the assembly to 
pass a resolution changing the state’s special status under the Indian 
constitution, everything was tried in the attempt to subdue the claim for self- 
determination, that most Kashmiris were clamouring for.
• While Delhi meddled politically and was responsible for the institutional 
decay and the death of democracy in this period, Kashmiri society 
developed socio-economically. This took place under the tutelage of 
Sheikh Abdullah, the larger then life, leader of the NC, who had been in and 
out of prison for more than twenty years, over his demand for self- 
determination for Kashmir. This socio-economic growth was responsible for
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a far more educated and politically alert Kashmiri populace, which by the 
end of the 70’s and early 80’s had become aware of its fundamental rights 
and less afraid of making its demands.
• This awareness led to an obvious political mobilisation. By the time the 
1982 elections were held in the state, there was a tangible opposition to 
New Delhi as well as the ruling NC. This had not been possible for 
decades, due to Delhi’s repressive politics and the hand in glove approach 
many past NC governments had taken to ensure that political opposition 
was not allowed to exist. This political mobilisation led to an ethno-religious 
divide, amongst the Muslim community in Kashmir, due to the coercive 
mechanisms used by the Indian state in order to prevent further political 
mobilisation. This mobilisation was the beginning of a mass secessionist 
movement that would characterise political life in Kashmir in the years to 
come.
• Further interference from Delhi and the NC’s collusion with the Congress to 
rig the 1987 elections, in their favour when they were widely expected to 
lose to an agglomeration of Muslim parties called the MUF, further 
increased the disappointment with Delhi and led to further alienation of 
Kashmiris. It was no surprise that many leaders of the secessionist outfits 
who took to violence later, were all MUF candidates, thus showing the 
direct link between the suppression of democratic institutions and violence.
• Strife within Kashmir in this period was mirrored by the complex geopolitical 
changes that were being effected in South Asia at the end of the 80’s. The 
establishment of the US as the hegemonic superpower and the unrest and 
radical Islamic movements that would engulf Afghanistan, would slowly 
have their effects felt in Kashmir as well
• By 1989, political mobilisation and secessionist movements had
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metamorphosed into civil unrest, public disturbances and finally a full blown 
insurgency movement that would engulf the state of Kashmir, dividing it on 
an ethno-religious basis, forever altering the heterogeneous aspect of 
Kashmiri society and creating a communal divide within the people.
• The scale of the insurgency took both India and Pakistan by surprise. 
Pakistan in the name of Kashmiri freedom, supported the insurgent groups 
on its soil, and then slowly transformed the nature of the movement. By 
introducing thousands of armed mujahedeen fighters from Afghanistan, 
Pakistan converted it into a full scale proxy war, with deeply religious 
undertones, sometimes overshadowing the very purpose the insurgency 
had started for -  independence.
• India responded to the insurgency poorly, by moving in thousands of troops 
to deal with a civil unrest. The end result being thousands of human rights 
abuses and further discontent with India and mistrust of her intentions, 
something that continues to affect how Kashmiris look at the rest of India 
today.
• In 1998, ten years after the insurgency, both countries tested nuclear 
weapons, further intensifying the conflict and turning the situation into a 
zero sum game. World attention returned to South Asia as tempers ran 
high.
• In 1999 months after a landmark peace agreement was signed, Pakistan 
infiltrated the LOC and the Kargil War was fought. Quick and decisive it 
illustrated India’s new aggressive policy and once again showed the world 
how volatile the subcontinent was. The Kargil War also marked the entry of 
the US into the conflict as an indirect negotiator - the US put pressure on 
Pakistan and changed the dynamics of the India - US -  Pakistan 
relationship permanently.
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• The military coup in Pakistan and its continued support for cross-border 
terrorism had turned the tide of world opinion against it in the period leading 
up to the 9/11 bombings. Just as it seemed that Pakistan would be forced 
into a settlement over Kashmir, the period after 9/11 would favour Pakistan 
as it became the forefront for the US led war on terror.
• The war on terror, also led to a restructuring of the Pakistani economy, 
through US aid and legitimised General Musharraf’s position in the eyes of 
the west. After radical terrorist attacks on Indian soil, Musharraf was forced 
to curtail terrorist activity on Pakistani soil, and slowly set the stage for 
negotiations with India over Kashmir.
• Post 9/11 the essentiality of the US role in Kashmir became clearer, with its 
influence over Pakistan and its growing closeness with India, which it sees 
as a natural democratic ally in a stronger Asia.
• Insurgent activity in Kashmir has reduced significantly with international 
pressure and newer less invasive Indian counter-terrorism strategies. The 
2002 elections in Kashmir, were the fairest in decades, as the peace 
process between the two countries has taken its first few tentative steps.
• The current peace initiative and the repositioning of the global world order, 
and its repercussions in South Asia, lead us to believe that the stage has 
been set for resolution of the Kashmir issue between India and Pakistan. 
Some of the indicators include, General Musharraf’s role in Pakistan his 
control over the army and the ability he has to convey the benefits of a 
solution to a doubting nation. India too needs to see a solution in keeping 
with its global aspirations and its growing economy. Politically, militarily 
and financially the signs seem to point towards consensus over the 
Kashmir issue in the next few years.
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• However before any actual settlement does take place, a number of steps 
need to be taken in order to make up for past mistakes that both sides have 
created, which have been outlined. Also no change is going to take place 
without changing mindsets in India, Pakistan and most importantly Kashmir.
• The actual outline of a settlement is difficult to ascertain at this stage, given 
the variety of options and the complicated negotiation procedure involved, 
with all the stakeholders involved It is however prudent to imagine a 
settlement that based on the LOC, recognising it as a permanent border, 
autonomy to a certain degree for both parts of Kashmir, demilitarisation of 
the region and large scale Kashmiri involvement in all aspects of 
government.
• In order to ensure a lasting peace, the settlement must be accepted in all 
parts by a majority of Kashmiris and an adequate self-rule framework 
needs to be established in both halves of Kashmir, in order to ensure this 
acceptance.
While the chance for an outcome in Pakistan is hinged on the abilities of 
one man largely, in India however finalising an outcome is not that simple. The 
virtues of democracy mean that, a variety of interest groups will need to be 
satisfied, before India accepts any solution, no matter any amount of posturing 
Manmohan Singh can do. These interest groups range from disaffected Kashmiri 
Muslims, affected non-Muslims from within Kashmir (i.e. the pundits, the Buddhists 
and the Sikh minorities, who see themselves as an integral part of Indi) and right 
wing Hindu-Nationalist parties within India, who will see any inch of space to 
Pakistan, as a sell out and a loss of prestige for India. Yet however much any 
opposition a settlement would face in India, the scale of opposition and adverse 
reactions in Pakistan would be far larger, given the interest groups that Musharraf 
would have to deal with. Apart from the army, denigration by religious hardliners
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and calls for autonomy from other separatist groups namely the Pashtuns and the 
Baluchis, would be an obvious outcome of any settlement over Kashmir.
Also there is consensus within India, that a solution to the Kashmir dispute 
can only be good for the country, both internationally and within Kashmir and other 
parts of India that have been prone to secessionist violence especially in parts of 
the North-East. A peaceful settlement in Kashmir, might misconstrue that India 
would willing to accept the secessionist claims of different regions, however this is 
unlikely, instead any settlement in Kashmir would show India takes its unity very 
seriously, and that will not internal struggles slow down its march ahead in the 
world , it would consolidate a stronger Indian Union and show the North-East, 
India’s willingness to negotiate to certain demands, yet not bargain over its very 
premise for existence. “Today, India is justifiably self-confident. Although some 
challenges left over from the 1960s still haunt the country, such as Maoist 
guerrillas in eastern and central India, religious extremism, and rural poverty, India 
has achieved impressive economic growth rates since the 1980s, has abandoned 
its antiquated policies o f nonalignment and Third World solidarity, and has 
dramatically improved relations with the United States ... Consequently, there is 
little reason to believe that India cannot continue to pursue its new foreign policy, 
maintain its domestic stability, and promote economic growth, ”102
Kashmir is probably the probably the most multifarious issue that envelopes 
South Asia today, it holds the key to a multitude of solutions and answers to the 
problems and questions that the subcontinent faces today. It is my honest belief 
that within Kashmir lies a solution to a greater subcontinent. By a greater 
subcontinent I mean, a stronger more united Pakistan, India, Sri Lanka and 
Bangladesh, one that could have lasting repercussions in a number of ways. The 
Tamil battle in Sri Lanka does not have the same ideological basis, however a 
solution in Kashmir could see the LTTE, wanting to settle for peace, perhaps a 
mammoth step forward.
102 Sumit Ganguly, Will Kashmir Stop India’s Rise (Foreign Affairs : Vol. 85, Issue 4, August 2006) 
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There is also talk of a common South Asian currency and stronger ties 
between all SAARC members, an organisation that aimed to do a lot, but 
stagnated due to the standoff between its two biggest members. The behemoth 
Indian economy has been growing at close to 10% today, this is growth that a lot 
of the other SAARC members can ride piggy-back on. There is no 
underestimating the link between economic development, improvement of lives 
and a broader sense of peace. If the Kashmir dispute is resolved, and India and 
Pakistan can use this economic bond, it would bring a huge amount prosperity and 
development into the most populated region in the world, and provide a panacea 
for the poverty that has engulfed it.
While the signs so far seem to point towards a settlement, there is always a 
lurking danger of derailment of this current peace process, which is slowly 
gathering momentum after its tentative initial steps. One can only hope that 
events that have been analysed in this thesis, have had enough of an impact in 
the past to ensure that this move towards the future is concrete and that one day, 
we may see
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VIII. ANNEXES
i. Historical Map of Kashmir Through the Ages
Figure 2
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ii. Jammu and Kashmir: Population Distribution 1981 to 2001 and Map
The distribution of population in the area of the erstwhile princely state of Jammu 
and Kashmir is, to a very large degree, contingent on the factors of physical 
geography discussed in respect to the foregoing general reference map. Figure 3 
provides a map of that distribution, by districts, as of 2001, the date of the most 
recent Indian census. Pakistan’s most recent census was taken in 1998 and we 
extrapolated district-level data for Azad Kashmir and the Northern Areas for that 
year, using the annual growth rates provided by the census, to derive the figures 
presented on the map and in the table below. Despite substantial growth over the 
period 1981-2001, the regional pattern of relatively high, medium, and low 
densities has altered little. In general, Indian-held Kashmir proper, Jammu, and 
Pakistani-held Azad Kashmir are areas in which densities range from medium to 
very high, while Ladakh and the Northern Areas are sparsely settled. Regional 
areas and their 1981 and 2001 population totals, as well as rates of population 
increase and 2001 population densities are indicated in the table below. At the 
district level, 2001 densities ranged from highs of 531 persons per square km. in 
Srinagar and 508 in Jammu to a low of only 2.6 in Leh.
Over the period from the first post-partition census in 1951 to the 1981 
enumeration the rate of population growth on the Pakistani side of the Line of 
Control was significantly higher than on the Indian side. However, if the figures 
provided in the table above are to be taken at face value, the reverse seems to be 
true for the period 1981-2001. The reasons for this are unclear. They may reflect 
any or all of the following: an increase in the rate of net emigration from Azad 
Kashmir and the Northern Areas; a net increase in the rate of immigration into 
those two regions (especially likely in regard to the Northern Areas since the 
completion of the Karakoram Highway); or the omission from the enumerated 
population in the Northern Areas of persons not native to the region (a hypothesis 
suggested by the remarkably low proportion of that population reported as 
speakers of non-local languages in the fragmentary languages available to us). In
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any event, the enumerated Northern Areas population in 1998 was substantially 
less than what we had formerly forecast based on demographic data provided in 
1987 by the Aga Khan Rural Support Programme.
Area Population Population % Increase Density in
Region (sq. 1981 (x 2001 (x (1981- 2001
km.)* 1,000) 1,000) 2001) (per sq
Indian-held areas
Kashmir 15,948 3,135 5,441 ' 73.6 341
Jammu 26,289 2,718 4,396 61.7 167
Ladakh 59,146 134 233 73.4 4
Total 101,383 5,987 10,070 68.2 10
Pakistani-held areas




Total 78,114 2,558 4,139 61.8 53
Chinese-held areas
Aksai Chin 37,555 virtually no-permanent location
Shaksgam 5,180 ditto
Total 42,735 ditto
Grand Total 222,236 8,545 14,209 66.3 64
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iii. UN Security Council Resolution 47 on Kashmir 
KASHMIR RESOLUTION
RESOLUTION 47 (1948) ON THE INDIA-PAKISTAN QUESTION SUBMITTED 
JOINTLY BY THE REPRESENTATIVES OF BELGIUM, CANADA, CHINA, 
COLUMBIA, THE UNITED KINGDOM AND UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND 
ADOPTED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL AT ITS 286TH MEETING HELD ON 
21 APRIL 1948. (DOCUMENT NO. S/726 DATED 21 APRIL 1948).
THE SECURITY COUNCIL
Having considered the complaint of the Government of India concerning the 
dispute over the State of Jammu and Kashmir, having heard the representative of 
India in support of that complaint and the reply and counter complaints of the 
representative of Pakistan,
Being strongly of opinion that the early restoration of peace and order in Jammu 
and Kashmir is essential and that India and Pakistan should do their utmost to 
bring about cessation of all fighting,
Noting with satisfaction that both India and Pakistan desire that the question of the 
accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan should be decided through 
the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite,
Considering that the continuation of the dispute is likely to endanger international 
peace and security,
Reaffirms its resolution 38 (1948) of 17 January 1948;
K A S H M I R  T H E  L A S T  T W E N T Y  Y E A R S  : M O V I N G  T O W A R D S  T H E  F U T U R E
85 | H R I S H A B H  S A N D I  L Y A I E P S  2 0 0 5 - 2 0 0 7
K A S H M I R  T H E  L A S T  T W E N T Y  Y E A R S  : M O V I N G  T O W A R D S  T H E  F U T U R E
Resolves that the membership of the Commission established by its resolution 39 
(1948) of 20 January 1948, shall be increased to five and shall include, in addition 
to the membership mentioned in that Resolution, representatives of ....and..., and 
that if the membership of the Commission has not been completed within ten days 
from the date of the adoption of this resolution the President of the Council may 
designate such other Member or Members of the United Nations as are required 
to complete the membership of five;
Instructs the Commission to proceed at once to the India sub-continent and there 
place its good offices and mediation at the disposal of the Governments of India 
and Pakistan with a view to facilitating the taking of the necessary measures, both 
with respect to the restoration of peace and order and to the holding of a plebiscite 
by the two Governments, acting in co-operation with one another and with the 
Commission, and further instructs the Commission to keep the Council informed of 
the action taken under the resolution; and, to this end,
Recommends to the Governments of India and Pakistan the following measures 
as those which in the opinion of the Council and appropriate to bring about a 
cessation of the fighting and to create proper conditions for a free and impartial 
plebiscite to decide whether the State of Jammu and Kashmir is to accede to India 
or Pakistan.
A - RESTORATION OF PEACE AND ORDER
1. The Government of Pakistan should undertake to use its best endeavours:
(a) To secure the withdrawal from the State of Jammu and Kashmir of tribesmen 
and Pakistani nationals not normally resident therein who have entered the State 
for the purposes of fighting, and to prevent any intrusion into the State of such 
elements and any furnishing of material aid to those fighting in the State;
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(b) To make known to all concerned that the measures indicated in this and the 
following paragraphs provide full freedom to all subjects of the State, regardless of 
creed, caste, or party, to express their views and to vote on the question of the 
accession of the State, and that therefore they should cooperate in the 
maintenance of peace and order.
2. The Government of India should:
(a) When it is established to the satisfaction of the Commission set up in 
accordance with the Council's Resolution 39 (1948) that the tribesmen are 
withdrawing and that arrangements for the cessation of the fighting have become 
effective, put into operation in consultation with the Commission a plan for 
withdrawing their own forces from Jammu and Kashmir and reducing them 
progressively to the minimum strength required for the support of the civil power in 
the maintenance of law and order;
(b) Make known that the withdrawal is taking place in stages and announce the 
completion of each stage;
(c) When the Indian forces shall have been reduced to the minimum strength 
mentioned in (a) above, arrange in consultation with the Commission for the 
stationing of the remaining forces to be carried out in accordance with the 
following principles:
(i) That the presence of troops should not afford any intimidation or appearance of 
intimidation to the inhabitants of the State;
(ii) That as small a number as possible should be retained in forward areas;
(iii) That any reserve of troops which may be included in the total strength should 
be located within their present base area.
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3. The Government of India should agree that until such time as the plebiscite 
administration referred to below finds it necessary to exercise the powers of 
direction and supervision over the State forces and policy provided for in 
paragraph 8, they will be held in areas to be agreed upon with the Plebiscite 
Administrator.
4. After the plan referred to in paragraph 2(a) above has been put into operation, 
personnel recruited locally in each district should so far as possible be utilized for 
the re-establishment and maintenance of law and order with due regard to 
protection of minorities, subject such additional requirements as may be specified 
by the Plebiscite Administration referred to in paragraph 7.
5. If these local forces should be found to be inadequate, the Commission, 
subject to the agreement of both the Government of India and the Government of 
Pakistan, should arrange for the use of such forces of either Dominion as it deems 
effective for the purpose of pacification.
B - PLEBISCITE
6. The Government of India should undertake to ensure that the Government of 
the State invite the major political groups to designate responsible representatives 
to share equitably and fully in the conduct of the administration at the ministerial 
level, while the plebiscite is being prepared and carried out.
7. The Government of India should undertake that there will be established in 
Jammu and Kashmir a Plebiscite Administration to hold a Plebiscite as soon as 
possible on the question of the accession of the State to India or Pakistan.
8. The Government of India should undertake that there will be delegated by the 
State to the Plebiscite Administration such powers as the latter considers
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necessary for holding a fair and impartial plebiscite including, for that purpose 
only, the direction and supervision of the State forces and police.
9. The Government of India should at the request of the Plebiscite Administration, 
make available from the Indian forces such assistance as the Plebiscite 
Administration may require for the performance of its functions.
10. (a) The Government of India should agree that a nominee of the Secretary- 
General of the United Nations will be appointed to be the Plebiscite Administrator.
(b) The Plebiscite Administrator, acting as an officer of the State of Jammu and 
Kashmir, should have authority to nominate the assistants and other subordinates 
and to draft regulations governing the Plebiscite. Such nominees should be 
formally appointed and such draft regulations should be formally promulgated by 
the State of Jammu and Kashmir.
(c) The Government of India should undertake that the Government of Jammu and 
Kashmir will appoint fully qualified persons nominated by the Plebiscite 
Administrator to act as special magistrates within the State judicial system to hear 
cases which in the opinion of the Plebiscite Administrator have a serious bearing 
on the preparation and the conduct of a free and impartial plebiscite.
(d) The terms of service of the Administrator should form the subject of a separate 
negotiation between the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the 
Government of India. The Administrator should fix the terms of service for his 
assistants and subordinates.
(e) The Administrator should have the right to communicate directly, with the 
Government of the State and with the Commission of the Security Council and, 
through the Commission, with the Security Council, with the Governments of India 
and Pakistan and with their representatives with the Commission. It would be his
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duty to bring to the notice of any or all of the foregoing (as he in his discretion may 
decide) any circumstances arising which may tend, in his opinion, to interfere with 
the freedom of the Plebiscite.
11. The Government of India should undertake to prevent and to give full support 
to the Administrator and his staff in preventing any threat, coercion or intimidation, 
bribery or other undue influence on the voters in the plebiscite, and the 
Government of India should publicly announce and should cause the Government 
of the State to announce this undertaking as an international obligation binding on 
all public authorities and officials in Jammu and Kashmir.
12. The Government of India should themselves and through the Government of 
the State declare and make known that all subjects of the State of Jammu and 
Kashmir, regardless of creed, caste or party, will be safe and free in expressing 
their views and in voting on the question of the accession of the State and that 
there will be freedom of the Press, speech and assembly and freedom of travel in 
the State, including freedom of lawful entry and exit.
13. The Government of India should use and should ensure that the Government 
of the State also use their best endeavour to effect the withdrawal from the State 
of all Indian nationals other than those who are normally resident therein or who 
on or since 15th August 1947 have entered it for a lawful purpose.
14. The Government of India should ensure that the Government of the State 
releases all political prisoners and take all possible steps so that:
(a) all citizens of the State who have left it on account of disturbances are invited 
and are free to return to their homes and to exercise their rights as such citizens;
(b) there is no victimization;
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(c) minorities in all parts of the State are accorded adequate protection.
15. The Commission of the Security Council should at the end of the plebiscite 
certify to the Council whether the plebiscite has or has not been really free and 
impartial.
C - GENERAL PROVISIONS
16. The Governments of India and Pakistan should each be invited to nominate a 
representative to be attached to the Commission for such assistance as it may 
require in the performance of its task.
17. The Commission should establish in Jammu and Kashmir such observers as
it may require of any of the proceedings in pursuance of the measures indicated in 
the foregoing paragraphs. -
18. The Security Council Commission should carry out the tasks assigned to it 
herein.
*The Security Council voted on this Resolution on 20-1-1948 with the following 
result:-
In favour: **Argentina, **Canada, China, France, **Syria, U.K. and U.S.A.
Against: None
Abstaining:**Belgium, **Columbia, **Ukranian S.S.R., and U.S.S.R.
UN Security Council, the United Nations, 1948 
Text available on the UN Web Site (http://www.un.org)
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iv. Article 370 of the Indian Constitution
Temporary provisions with respect to the State of Jammu and Kashmir.— (1) 
Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution,—
(a) the provisions of article 238 shall not apply in relation to the State of Jammu 
and Kashmir;
(b) the power of Parliament to make laws for the said State shall be limited to—
(i) those matters in the Union List and the Concurrent List which, in consultation 
with the Government of the State, are declared by the President to correspond to 
matters specified in the Instrument of Accession governing the accession of the 
State to the
Dominion of India as the matters with respect to which the Dominion Legislature 
may make laws for that State; and
(ii) such other matters in the said Lists as, with the concurrence of the Government 
of the State, the President may by order specify.
Explanation. —  For the purposes of this article, the Government of the State 
means the person for the time being recognised by the President as the Maharaja 
of Jammu and Kashmir acting on the advice of the Council of Ministers for the 
time being in office under the Maharaja’s Proclamation dated the fifth day of 
March, 1948;
(c) the provisions of article 1 and of this article shall apply in relation to that State;
(d) such of the other provisions of this Constitution shall apply in relation to that 
State subject to such exceptions and modifications as the President may by order 
specifyProvided that no such order which relates to the matters specified in the 
Instrument of Accession of the State referred to in paragraph (i) of sub-clause (b) 
shall be issued except in consultation with the Government of the State:
Provided further that no such order which relates to matters other than those
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referred to in the last preceding proviso shall be issued except with the 
concurrence of that Government.
(2) If the concurrence of the Government of the State referred to in paragraph (ii) 
of sub-clause (b) of clause (1) or in the second proviso to sub-clause (d) of that 
clause be given before the Constituent Assembly for the purpose of framing the 
Constitution of the State is convened, it shall be placed before such Assembly for 
such decision as it may take thereon.
(3) Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing provisions of this article, the 
President may, by public notification, declare that this article shall cease to be 
operative or shall be operative only with such exceptions and modifications and 
from such date as he may specify:
Provided that the recommendation of the Constituent Assembly of the State 
referred to in clause (2) shall be necessary before the President issues such a 
notification.
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v. The Lahore Declaration
The Prime Ministers of the Republic of India and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan:
Sharing a vision of peace and stability between their countries, and of progress 
and prosperity for their peoples;
Convinced that durable peace and development of harmonious relations and 
friendly cooperation will serve the vital interests of the peoples of the two 
countries, enabling them to devote their energies for a better future;
Recognising that the nuclear dimension of the security environment of the two 
countries adds to their responsibility for avoidance of conflict between the two 
countries;
Committed to the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, 
and the universally accepted principles of peaceful co- existence;
Reiterating the determination of both countries to implementing the Simla 
Agreement in letter and spirit;
Committed to the objective of universal nuclear disarmament and non- 
proliferartion;
Convinced of the importance of mutually agreed confidence building measures for 
improving the security environment;
Recalling their agreement of 23rd September, 1998, that an environment of peace 
and security is in the supreme national interest of both sides and that the 
resolution of all outstanding issues, including Jammu and Kashmir, is essential for 
this purpose;
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Have agreed that their respective Governments:
1. shall intensify their efforts to resolve all issues, including the issue of 
Jammu and Kashmir.
2. shall refrain from intervention and interference in each other's internal 
affairs.
3. shall intensify their composite and integrated dialogue process for an early 
and positive outcome of the agreed bilateral agenda.
4. shall take immediate steps for reducing the risk of accidental or 
unauthorised use of nuclear weapons and discuss concepts and doctrines with a 
view to elaborating measures for confidence building in the nuclear and 
conventional fields, aimed at prevention of conflict.
5. reaffirm their commitment to the goals and objectives of SAARC and to 
concert their efforts towards the realisation of the SAARC vision for the year 2000 
and beyond with a view to promoting the welfare of the peoples of South Asia and 
to improve their quality of life through accelerated economic growth, social 
progress and cultural development.
6. reaffirm their condemnation of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations 
and their determination to combat this menace.
7. shall promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
Signed at Lahore on the 21st day of February 1999.
Atal Behari Vajpayee 
Prime Minister of the Republic of India 
&
Muhammad Nawaz Sharif
Republic of Prime Minister of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan
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vi. The Instrument of Accession
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vii. Alternative Solutions to the Kashmir Conflict
1. Maintain the territorial state quo in Kashmir along the LOC.
2. Secure Kashmir’s accession to Pakistan.
3. Create an independent Kashmir.
4. Secure a “Trieste” solution (like the disputed city of Trieste which was 
partitioned between Italy and Yugoslavia) through the Territorial transfer 
of the Vale of Kashmir to Pakistan.
5. Implement a “Tibetan” solution by Transforming the Demographics in 
Kashmir (that is, follow the China model that allegedly reduced the 
Tibetans into a minority by settling Tibet with its Han Chinese. India 
could do with Hindus and Sikhs).
6. Generate an exodus of Kashmiri Muslims into Pakistan through repressive 
or persuasive measures.
7. Achieve joint Indo-Pakistani control over Kashmir.
8. Foster a subcontinent of several independent states.
9. Promote a decentralized sub continental confederation of several 
autonomous states.
10. As required by the UN Security Council, hold a plebiscite to ascertain the 
wishes of Kashmiris.
11. Grant a protectorate status to Kashmir
Courtesy Rathnam Indurthy, Kashmir Between India and Pakistan, 2003
97 I H R I S H A B H  S A N D I L Y A I E P S  2 0 0 5 - 2 0 0 7
